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Articles 
Foreign Assistance Complicity 
ALEXANDER K.A. GREENAWALT* 
When does a government’s provision of assistance to 
foreign armed groups cross the line from legitimate 
foreign policy to criminal aiding and abetting of those 
who use the aid to commit atrocities?  The question 
presents one of the most difficult dilemmas in criminal 
justice, one that has deep normative implications and 
has provoked sharp splits among the U.S. federal 
courts and international tribunals that have faced it. 
In 2013, the Appeals Chamber of the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) 
sent shockwaves through international legal circles 
when it acquitted former Yugoslav Army chief 
Momčilo Perišić of aiding and abetting atrocities in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina during the early 1990s.  In-
fluenced perhaps by contemporary examples such as 
U.S. support for Syrian rebels, the Tribunal ruled that 
“neutral” support to armed groups engaged in com-
bat activities could not give rise to criminal responsi-
bility absent evidence that the support was “specifi-
cally directed” toward the group’s unlawful activities.  
The aftermath of the ruling has produced widespread 
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criticism, but little clarity on how the law should draw 
the line between legitimate foreign assistance on the 
one hand and criminal complicity on the other.  Do-
mestic legal systems take different approaches to 
complicity, and even at the international level the law 
depends very much on which tribunal—and even 
which particular judge—happens to be deciding a 
case. 
In this Article, I contribute to the debate over the for-
eign assistance cases by questioning two of its key 
premises.  First, I challenge the pervasive assumption 
that the resolution of these cases can and should be 
determined by recourse to the kind of precedential 
analysis that has dominated judicial consideration of 
international aiding and abetting cases.  As a descrip-
tive matter, the case law is mistaken to maintain that 
the historical precedents reveal a consistent approach 
to aiding and abetting that evidences settled principles 
of customary international law.  As a prescriptive 
matter, international tribunals’ reliance on prece-
dent—however well-founded—is no substitute for the 
kind of normative analysis that is necessary to secure 
adequate protections against injustice. 
Second, I contest the assumption that the resolution of 
individual foreign assistance cases turns on the par-
ticular doctrinal choices that have divided judges and 
commentators.  Analysis of the competing approaches 
to aiding and abetting reveals that there is less at 
stake in the choice of elements than is commonly sup-
posed, because each approach leaves room for sub-
stantial flexibility in interpretation and application.  
Moreover, the most plausible understandings are also 
the least determinate, suggesting that the resolution of 
the foreign assistance cases must inevitably rely on 
complex moral judgments that resist easy encapsula-
tion in the legal elements that have traditionally 
served to police the boundaries of criminal responsi-
bility. 
The combined effect of these insights reveals an inde-
terminacy that is both inevitable and familiar to crim-
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inal law.  I conclude by considering how courts might 
manage this indeterminacy in a way that renders the 
assignment of criminal responsibility sufficiently pre-
dictable while also maintaining a normatively mean-
ingful distinction between guilt and innocence. 
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INTRODUCTION 
For the past several years, the U.S. government—alongside 
other states—has provided assistance, including non-lethal aid, mili-
tary training, and arms, to the Free Syrian Army (FSA) and other 
moderate rebels engaged in conflict with both the Syrian government 
and, more recently, with extremist rebel groups such as the Islamic 
State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS).1  During this same period, the world 
has watched in horror as forces affiliated with the Syrian government 
have committed widespread atrocities, including torture, extra-
judicial killings, attacks on civilians, and the deployment of chemical 
weapons.2  The crimes of ISIS, moreover, have been headline news 
for the past two years.3  Human rights monitors have also document-
ed, on a lesser scale, crimes committed by FSA-affiliated groups, in-
cluding summary executions and the recruitment of child soldiers.4  
 
 1. See, e.g., Michael D. Shear et al., Obama Administration Ends Effort to Train 
Syrians to Combat ISIS, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 2015, at A1 (reporting abandonment of the U.S. 
effort to train a new rebel force in Syria and establishment of a new Defense Department 
program to provide assistance directly to rebel groups “who would sign a pledge to fight the 
Islamic State group, receive some instruction on human rights, [and] review the law of 
armed conflict”); Julian E. Barnes, U.S. to Begin Deploying Troops to Aid Syrian Rebel 
Training, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 16, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-sending-400-troops-
to-train-moderate-syrian-opposition-1421393093 (detailing U.S. efforts to train and equip 
moderate Syrian rebels to fight ISIS); Steven Lee Myers, U.S. Joins Effort to Equip and Pay 
Rebels in Syria, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 2012, at A1 (reporting humanitarian and logistical aid 
to Syrian rebels provided by the United States and other countries); Jay Solomon & Nour 
Malas, U.S. Bolsters Ties to Fighters in Syria, WALL ST. J. (June 13, 2012), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303410404577464763551149048 
(reporting CIA training of the FSA). 
 2. See, e.g., Human Rights Council, Rep. of the Indep. Int’l Comm’n of Inquiry on 
the Syrian Arab Republic, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/27/60 (Aug. 13, 2014) [hereinafter 8th Report 
of Commission of Inquiry on Syria]; “No One’s Left”:  Summary Executions by Syrian 
Forces in Al-Bayda and Baniyas, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Sept. 13, 2013), 
https://perma.cc/PJK2-Q38A; Attacks on Gouta:  Analysis of Alleged Use of Chemical 
Weapons in Syria, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Sept. 2013), https://perma.cc/3BCJ-BS2T; Death 
from the Skies:  Deliberate and Indiscriminate Air Strikes on Civilians, HUM. RTS. WATCH 
(Apr. 2013), https://perma.cc/B4XJ-2W9G; In Cold Blood:  Summary Executions by Syrian 
Security Forces and Pro-Government Militias, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Apr. 2012), 
https://perma.cc/ZXB5-JUDE. 
 3. See, e.g., Indep. Int’l Comm’n of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, Rule of 
Terror:  Living Under ISIS in Syria (Nov. 14, 2014), http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/ 
5469b2e14.pdf; 8th Report of Commission of Inquiry on Syria, supra note 2. 
 4. Human Rights Council, Rep. of the Indep. Int’l Comm’n of Inquiry on the Syrian 
Arab Republic, 8, 13, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/25/65 (Feb. 12, 2014) [hereinafter 7th Report of 
Commission of Inquiry on Syria] (documenting instances of summary executions 
perpetrated by FSA-affiliated groups as well as the recruitment of child soldiers by several 
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Suppose that the U.S. officials involved in providing this assistance 
are aware that some of the aid—however well intended—will una-
voidably find itself directed toward criminal activity.  Is that 
knowledge sufficient to hold the officials criminally responsible for 
aiding and abetting the crimes facilitated by their assistance? 
I imagine that most readers will resist that conclusion.  Ex-
plaining why can be a complicated matter.  The question of when as-
sistance to governments and armed groups becomes prohibited aiding 
and abetting has vexed both domestic and international courts in re-
cent years.  In the United States, the federal courts have confronted 
the scope of aiding and abetting liability in the context of claims aris-
ing against multinational corporations that allegedly aided and abet-
ted human rights abuses by various governments in violation of the 
Alien Tort Statute (ATS).5  Although ATS claims involve tort actions 
rather than criminal prosecutions,6 the federal courts have commonly 
looked to international criminal law sources for the applicable stand-
ards of liability.7 
 
FSA-affiliated groups); Human Rights Council, Rep. of the Indep. Int’l Comm’n of Inquiry 
on the Syrian Arab Republic, 2, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/22/59 (Feb. 5, 2013) (noting that “[t]he 
violations and abuses committed by anti-Government armed groups did not, however, reach 
the intensity and scale of those committed by Government forces and affiliated militia”); 
Maybe We Live and Maybe We Die:  Recruitment and Use of Children by Armed Groups in 
Syria, HUM. RTS. WATCH (June 22, 2014), http://www.hrw.org/reports/2014/06/22/maybe-
we-live-and-maybe-we-die (documenting recruitment and use of children by various Syrian 
armed groups, including the FSA). 
 5. See, e.g., Doe VIII v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (alleging 
that Exxon aided and abetted human rights abuses in Indonesia); Aziz v. Alcolac, Inc., 658 
F.3d 388, 389 (4th Cir. 2011) (submitting claims “alleging that Defendant Alcolac, Inc., a 
chemical manufacturer, sold thiodiglycol (‘TDG’) to Saddam Hussein’s Iraqi regime, which 
then used it to manufacture mustard gas to attack Kurdish enclaves in northern Iraq during 
the late 1980s”); Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 582 F.3d 244, 247 
(2d Cir. 2009) (confronting claims that defendant Talisman Energy, Inc. “aided and abetted 
or conspired with the Government to advance those abuses that facilitated the development 
of Sudanese oil concessions by Talisman affiliates”); Khulumani v. Barclay Nat’l Bank Ltd., 
504 F.3d 254, 258 (2d Cir. 2007) (bringing claims against “approximately fifty corporate 
defendants” alleging that “these defendants actively and willingly collaborated with the 
government of South Africa in maintaining a repressive, racially based system known as 
‘apartheid,’ which restricted the majority black African population in all areas of life while 
providing benefits for the minority white population”).  
 6. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil 
action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of 
the United States.”). 
 7. See Doe VIII, 654 F.3d at 39 (“[W]e hold that aiding and abetting liability is 
available under the ATS because it involves a norm established by customary international 
law and that the mens rea and actus reus requirements are those established by the ICTY, 
the ICTR, and the Nuremberg tribunals, whose opinions constitute expressions of customary 
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These sources date to the World War II era, when a variety of 
tribunals prosecuted individuals as accomplices to war crimes under 
international law.  Among other notable cases, a British military tri-
bunal convicted two executives of a company that supplied the poi-
son gas used by the Schutzstaffel (SS) in the Auschwitz gas cham-
bers,8 and a U.S. military tribunal convicted two German 
industrialists for making large donations to a fund that financed the 
SS.9 
More recently, in 2013, the Appeals Chamber of the Interna-
tional Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) sent 
shockwaves through international legal circles when it acquitted 
Momčilo Perišić of aiding and abetting atrocities in Bosnia and Her-
zegovina during the early 1990s.10  Two years before, the ICTY Trial 
Chamber had sentenced Perišić to twenty-seven years in prison for 
his contribution to these crimes.11  As the top military officer in the 
Yugoslav Army headquartered in Belgrade, Serbia, the accused had 
used his position to provide critical support to Bosnian Serb sepa-
ratist forces—the Army of Republika Srpska (VRS)—which engaged 
in “systematic and widespread sniping and shelling of civilians”12 in 
the besieged city of Sarajevo and massacred thousands of Bosnian 
Muslim civilians following the takeover of Srebrenica in 1995.  The 
Trial Chamber ruling emphasized the many ways in which the ac-
cused had “repeatedly exercised his authority to provide logistic and 
personnel assistance that made it possible for the VRS to wage a war 
that he knew encompassed systematic crimes against Muslim civil-
 
international law.”); Aziz, 658 F.3d at 398 (“[W]e agree that Sosa [v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 
U.S. 692 (2004)] guides courts to international law to determine the standard for imposing 
accessorial liability.”); Presbyterian Church of Sudan, 582 F.3d at 257 (“We agree that Sosa 
and our precedents send us to international law to find the standard for accessorial 
liability.”). 
 8. Case No. 9, The Zyklon B Case, Trial of Bruno Tesch and Two Others, in 1 U.N. 
WAR CRIMES COMM’N, LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS 93, 102 (1947) 
[hereinafter The Zyklon B Case]. 
 9. 6 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS 
UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO. 10:  “THE FLICK CASE” 1222–23 (1952) [hereinafter The 
Flick Case] (“One who knowingly by his influence and money contributes to the support [of 
an organization which on a large scale is responsible for war crimes and crimes against 
humanity] must, under settled legal principles, be deemed to be, if not a principal, certainly 
an accessory to such crimes.”). 
 10. See Prosecutor v. Perišić, Case No. IT-04-81-A, Judgment (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the 
Former Yugoslavia Feb. 28, 2013). 
 11. See Prosecutor v. Perišić, Case No. IT-04-81-T, Judgment (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the 
Former Yugoslavia Sept. 6, 2011). 
 12. Id. ¶ 1590. 
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ians.”13  These efforts included the “provision of weapons and am-
munition, technical experts, training, medical support, fuel and opera-
tional support,”14 the payment of VRS salaries, and the transfer of 
over 7,000 Yugoslav Army officers to the VRS.15  Indeed, as the Tri-
al Chamber found, the Bosnian Serb leaders “were clearly aware that 
their war depended on assistance from [the Yugoslav Army].”16 
For the Appeals Chamber that acquitted Perišić, however, 
none of these considerations had decisive importance.  The VRS was 
not merely a criminal organization but was also a fighting force en-
gaged in legitimate combat activities, and “a reasonable interpreta-
tion of the record is that [Yugoslav Army] aid facilitated by Perišić 
was directed towards the VRS’s general war effort rather than VRS 
crimes.”17  Relying on language from an earlier Appeals Chamber 
judgment, the Tribunal ruled that providers of remote assistance such 
as Perišić’s could not be convicted absent proof that they “specifical-
ly directed” that aid toward criminal activities.18  The fact that Perišić 
might knowingly have undertaken actions that he knew would sub-
stantially facilitate atrocities in Bosnia was therefore immaterial. 
The ruling provoked strong reactions on multiple fronts.  At 
the methodological level, the judgment has focused attention on the 
difficult and contested process by which courts have determined the 
content of international criminal law.  As has traditionally been the 
case with international criminal tribunals, the ICTY Statute prohibits 
aiding and abetting without specifying the elements required to estab-
lish this form of culpability.19  Accordingly, the ICTY has instead 
 
 13. Id. ¶ 1621. 
 14. Id. ¶ 1594. 
 15. Id. ¶¶ 1607–19. 
 16. Id. ¶ 1598. 
 17. Prosecutor v. Perišić, Case No. IT-04-81-A, Judgment, ¶ 71 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for 
the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 28, 2013). 
 18. Id. ¶ 73. 
 19. The ICTY’s Statute merely provides as follows:  “A person who planned, 
instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise aided and abetted in the planning, preparation or 
execution of a crime referred to in . . . the present Statute, shall be individually responsible 
for the crime.”  S.C. Res. 1877, Updated Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for 
the Former Yugoslavia, art. 7 (July 7, 2009) [hereinafter ICTY Statute]; see also S.C. Res. 
995, Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, art. 6(1) (Aug. 14, 2002) 
[hereinafter ICTR Statute] (same); Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone art. 6(1), 
Apr. 12, 2002, 2178 U.N.T.S. 138 [hereinafter SCSL Statute] (same); Law on the 
Establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia for the Prosecution 
of Crimes Committed During the Period of Democratic Kampuchea (2001), as amended by 
NS/RKM/1004/006 (Oct. 27, 2004), art. 29 [hereinafter ECCC Statute] (“Any Suspect who 
planned, instigated, ordered, aided and abetted, or committed the crimes referred to in article 
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purported to apply rules of accomplice liability derived from uncodi-
fied customary international law and discovered primarily through 
consulting the case law of international criminal tribunals.20  Substan-
tial attention has focused on whether the Perišić requirement of spe-
cific direction is consistent with these precedents or whether the Trial 
Chamber was instead correct to view responsibility in terms of the 
accused’s knowing and substantial contribution to crime.21 
The aftermath of Perišić reflects continued disagreement on 
these matters, with the standards of accomplice liability depending 
very much on which tribunal—and which particular judge—happens 
to decide the case.  A September 2013 judgment of the Appeals 
Chamber of the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) upheld the 
 
3 new, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 of this law shall be individually responsible for the crime.”); S.C. Res. 
1757, annex, Statute of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, art. 2(b)(1)(a) (Mar. 29, 2006) 
[hereinafter STL Statute] (“A person shall be individually responsible for crimes within the 
jurisdiction of the Special Tribunal if that person . . . [c]ommitted, participated as 
accomplice, organized or directed others to commit the crime set forth in article 2 of this 
Statute . . . .”); London Charter of the International Military Tribunal art. 6, Aug. 8, 1945, 82 
U.N.T.S. 279 [hereinafter London Charter] (“Leaders, organizers, instigators and 
accomplices participating in the formulation or execution of a common plan or conspiracy to 
commit any of the foregoing crimes are responsible for all acts performed by any persons in 
execution of such plan.”); Control Council Law No. 10:  Punishment of Persons Guilty of 
War Crimes, Crimes Against Peace and Against Humanity art. II(2), Dec. 20, 1945, 3 
OFFICIAL GAZETTE CONTROL COUNCIL FOR GERMANY 50–55 (1946) [hereinafter Control 
Council Law No. 10] (“Any person without regard to nationality or the capacity in which he 
acted, is deemed to have committed a crime as defined in paragraph 1 of this Article, if he 
was (a) a principal or (b) was an accessory to the commission of any such crime or ordered 
or abetted the same or (c) took a consenting part therein or (d) was connected with plans or 
enterprises involving its commission or (e) was a member of any organization or group 
connected with the commission of any such crime or (f) with reference to paragraph 1 (a) if 
he held a high political, civil or military (including General Staff) position in Germany or in 
one of its Allies, co-belligerents or satellites or held high position in the financial, industrial 
or economic life of any such country.”). 
 20. See infra Part I. 
 21. See generally Antonio Coco & Tom Gal, Losing Direction:  The ICTY Appeals 
Chamber’s Controversial Approach to Aiding and Abetting in Perišić, 12 J. INT’L CRIM. 
JUST. 345 (2014); Manuel J. Ventura, Farewell “Specific Direction”:  Aiding and Abetting 
War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity in Perišić, Taylor, Šainović et al., and US Alien 
Tort Statute Jurisprudence, in THE WAR REPORT:  ARMED CONFLICT IN 2013, at 511, 512 
(Stuart Casey-Maslen ed., 2015) (“When one scratches below the surface, it becomes 
apparent that there was simply no proper legal basis in Perišić for requiring specific 
direction in the actus reus of aiding and abetting.”); Leila Nadya Sadat, Can the ICTY 
Šainović and Perišić Cases Be Reconciled?, 108 AM. J. INT’L L. 475 (2014); James Stewart, 
Specific Direction is Unprecedented:  Results from Two Empirical Studies, EJIL:  TALK! 
(Sept. 4, 2013), http://www.ejiltalk.org/specific-direction-is-unprecedented-results-from-
two-empirical-studies [hereinafter Stewart, Unprecedented] (arguing that “Case-Law in 
International Criminal Law Does Not Support ‘Specific Direction’”). 
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conviction of former Liberian President Charles Taylor for aiding 
and abetting crimes committed by the Revolutionary United Front 
(RUF) and the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) in Sier-
ra Leone.22  The conviction rested on a similar theory to the prosecu-
tion’s case in Perišić—Taylor had provided critical support to these 
forces in the form of weapons, supplies, and operational support23—
and the Appeals Chamber expressly rejected the Perišić specific di-
rection standard.  The judgment also went farther than the ICTY case 
law in maintaining that, in the absence of proof that the accused had 
intentionally or knowingly assisted a crime, aiding and abetting could 
be established based on a form of recklessness.24  Since then, two dif-
ferently composed ICTY Appeals Chambers have twice repudiated 
the specific direction standard,25 most recently in December 2015 
when a divided panel reversed a Trial Chamber judgment that had 
applied Perišić to acquit two Serbian security officials accused of 
aiding and abetting crimes committed in Bosnia and Croatia by par-
amilitary units that the defendants had worked to establish, finance, 
train, and otherwise support.26  With no formal mechanism—such as 
en banc review—for resolving the split, these judgments have left the 
ICTY with a conflicted jurisprudence.27  The Statute of the Interna-
tional Criminal Court (ICC), meanwhile, includes a complicity provi-
sion (as of yet untested) that appears to enforce a stricter, purpose-
based version of complicity that arguably resembles the Perišić ap-
 
 22. Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-A, Judgment (Sept. 26, 2013). 
 23. Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 6907–53 (May 18, 
2012). 
 24. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-A, ¶ 438 (holding dolus eventualis satisfies the 
mental requirements for aiding and abetting).  On dolus eventualis, see infra note 71 and 
accompanying text. 
 25. See Prosecutor v. Stanišić, Case No. IT-03-69-A, Judgment, ¶¶ 103–08 (Int’l Crim. 
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 9, 2015); Prosecutor v. Šainović, Case No. IT-05-87-
A, Judgment, ¶¶ 1649–51 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Jan. 23, 2014). 
 26. Stanišić, Case No. IT-03-69-A, ¶¶ 103–08.  The allegations against the accused are 
detailed in the Trial Chamber’s Judgment.  See generally Prosecutor v. Stanišić, Case No. 
IT-03-69-T, Judgment, Volume II of II, ¶¶ 1287–2354 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former 
Yugoslavia May 30, 2013).  The Appeals Chamber further ordered a re-trial of the accused.  
Stanišić, Case No. IT-03-69-A, ¶ 127. 
 27. On the institutional problems associated with this split, see Marko Milanovic, The 
Self-Fragmentation of the ICTY Appeals Chamber, EJIL:  TALK! (Jan. 23, 2014), http:// 
www.ejiltalk.org/the-self-fragmentation-of-the-icty-appeals-chamber; Sash Jayawardane & 
Charlotte Divin, The Gotovina, Perišić and Šainović Appeal Judgments:  Implications for 
International Criminal Justice Mechanisms, HAGUE INST. GLOBAL JUST. (Sept. 2014), 
http://www.thehagueinstituteforglobaljustice.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/PB13-Goto 
vina-Perisic-Sainovic-Appeal-Judgments.pdf. 
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proach.28  Yet, elsewhere, the same statute indicates that a broader 
knowledge-based standard applies in cases involving aid to criminal 
enterprises.29  In the United States, the ATS case law mirrors this di-
vide among the international tribunals, with the precedents split on 
whether the requisite mens rea is purpose30 or knowledge31 and with 
litigation pending on the impact, if any, of the specific direction 
standard.32 
As a normative matter, the debate surrounding Perišić has 
raised some of the most important and difficult questions concerning 
the appropriate boundaries of criminal law.  Critics of the judgment 
have worried that its strict approach provides a manual for officials 
on how to support atrocities without fear of criminal responsibility.  
As Marko Milanovic has argued, for example, the acquittal on aiding 
and abetting: 
[E]ssentially boils down to the conclusion that it will 
be practically impossible to convict under aiding and 
abetting any political or military leader external to a 
conflict who is assisting one of the parties even while 
knowing that they are engaging in mass atrocities, so 
long as that leader is remote from the actual opera-
tions and is not so thoroughly stupid to leave a smok-
 
 28. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 25(3)(c), July 17, 1998, 
2187 U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter Rome Statute] (“In accordance with this Statute, a person 
shall be criminally responsible and liable for punishment of a crime within the jurisdiction of 
the Court if that person . . . [f]or the purpose of facilitating the commission of such a crime, 
aids, abets or otherwise assists in its commission or its attempted commission, including 
providing means for its commission.”) (emphasis added). 
 29. Id. at art. 25(3)(d) (assigning criminal responsibility to one who “[i]n any other 
way contributes to the commission or attempted commission of such a crime by a group of 
persons acting with a common purpose” where the contribution is “intentional” and, inter 
alia, “made in the knowledge of the intention of the group to commit the crime”). 
 30. See Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 582 F.3d 244, 259 (2d 
Cir. 2009) (“Thus, applying international law, we hold that the mens rea standard for aiding 
and abetting liability in ATS actions is purpose rather than knowledge alone.”). 
 31. See Doe VIII v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11, 39 (D.C. Cir. 2011) 
(“Accordingly, we hold that aiding and abetting liability is available under the ATS because 
it involves a norm established by customary international law and that the mens rea and 
actus reus requirements are those established by the ICTY, the ICTR, and the Nuremberg 
tribunals, whose opinions constitute expressions of customary international law.”). 
 32. Doe I v. Nestle USA, Inc., 766 F.3d 1013, 1026–27 (9th Cir. 2014) (“remand[ing] 
to the district court with instructions to allow plaintiffs to amend their complaint in light of 
Perisic and Taylor, both of which were decided after the complaint in this case was 
dismissed and this appeal had been filed”). 
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ing gun behind him.33 
On the other hand, there are also concerns about the bounda-
ries of an international complicity doctrine that is not restrained by 
something like a specific direction standard.  Kevin Jon Heller has 
argued that: 
In the absence of the specific-direction requirement, 
the [ICTY’s] expansive mens rea of aiding and abet-
ting puts individuals who interact with organizations 
engaged in both lawful and unlawful acts in an impos-
sible position.  If they are aware of the unlawful acts, 
they cannot provide the organization with any assis-
tance that might end up facilitating them—even if they 
do not intend to facilitate those acts, and even if they 
do everything in their power to prevent their facilita-
tion.34 
The contemporary geopolitical implications of this slippery 
slope have figured especially prominently in the complicity debate.  
Several commentators have raised the aforementioned question of 
how criminal law should view assistance to the Syrian rebels.35  And 
during the closing arguments of Perišić’s trial proceedings, Judge 
Bakone Justice Moloto (the sole dissenter from the original convic-
tion) grilled the prosecution on whether its theory of aiding and abet-
 
 33. Marko Milanovic, The Limits of Aiding and Abetting Liability:  The ICTY Appeals 
Chamber Acquits Momcilo Perisic, EJIL:  TALK! (Mar. 11, 2013), http://www.ejiltalk.org/ 
the-limits-of-aiding-and-abetting-liability-the-icty-appeals-chamber-acquits-momcilo-
perisic; see also Kenneth Roth, Opinion, A Tribunal’s Legal Stumble, N.Y. TIMES (July 9, 
2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/10/opinion/global/a-tribunals-legal-stumble.html 
(“[The ICTY] has suddenly established a precedent that, unless changed, could cripple future 
efforts to prosecute senior officials responsible for human rights crimes.”). 
 34. Kevin Jon Heller, Why the ICTY’s “Specifically Directed” Requirement Is 
Justified, OPINIO JURIS (June 2, 2013), http://opiniojuris.org/2013/06/02/why-the-ictys-
specifically-directed-requirement-is-justified. 
 35. See, e.g., id. (“Unless they avoid reading every major newspaper in the world, both 
the British government and the CIA are fully aware that rebel groups in Syria are engaged in 
both lawful and unlawful activities.  As a result, insofar as the British government and the 
CIA nevertheless provide those groups with weapons, they are legally responsible for aiding 
and abetting any international crimes that their assistance ends up facilitating—even if they 
do everything in their power to assist only lawful rebel actions.”); Milanovic, supra note 33 
(“Consider, for example, the current situation in Syria, where a number of foreign 
governments are providing various types of support to either the Syrian regime or (more 
likely) the opposition, while knowing quite well that both sides have engaged in crimes 
against international law and that the aid that they are giving is contributing or is likely to 
contribute to the commission of these crimes.  Are these foreign leaders thereby culpable as 
aiders and abettors?  The Appeals Chamber is surely correct that there should be a difference 
between contributions to the war effort as such and to the commission of specific crimes.”). 
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ting would have the effect of inculpating all the NATO commanders 
engaged in the Afghanistan war based on their awareness of crimes 
committed by some participants against detainees.36 
In sum, then, the problem of assistance to armed groups (aris-
ing in what I loosely refer to as the “foreign assistance cases”) raises 
deep methodological and normative challenges that have divided 
courts and commenters.  This Article contributes to the debate on aid-
ing and abetting by challenging two assumptions that have pervaded 
discussion of the issue. 
First, I dispute the widespread judicial assumption that the 
resolution of these cases can and should be determined by recourse to 
the kind of precedential analysis that has dominated judicial consid-
eration of aiding and abetting cases arising under international law.  
As a descriptive matter, the case law mistakenly maintains that the 
historical precedents reveal a consistent approach to aiding and abet-
ting that evidences settled principles of customary international law.  
As a prescriptive matter, the tribunals’ reliance on precedent—
however well-founded—is no substitute for the kind of normative 
analysis that is necessary to secure adequate protections against in-
justice. 
Second, I challenge the assumption that the resolution of for-
eign assistance cases turns on the particular doctrinal choices that 
have divided judges and commentators.  Instead, the most critical is-
sues surrounding the reach of complicity have less to do with the 
identification of legal elements themselves than with their interpreta-
 
 36. See Prosecutor v. Perišić, Case No. IT-04-81-T, Transcript, 14660 (Int’l Crim. 
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 28, 2011) (“[T]he point I’m asking simply is because 
the armies, the commanders of the remaining NATO countries that are participating in 
Afghanistan are aware of the fact that crimes have been committed, crimes against humanity 
have been committed, and yet those commanders are still continuing to participate in that 
war, are they then guilty of those crimes that are being committed?”).  The suspicion that the 
Appeals judgment was motivated by considerations of this sort also provided a source of 
political intrigue at the Tribunal itself.  In a June 2013 e-mail subsequently leaked to the 
press, ICTY Judge Frederik Harhoff speculated that the acquittal of Perišić and also, several 
months before, of Croatian general Ante Gotovina indicated “that the military establishment 
in leading states (such as USA and Israel) felt that the courts in practice were getting too 
close to the military commanders’ responsibilities.”  See E-mail from Frederik Harhoff, 
Judge, Int’l. Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia, to Various Contacts (June 6, 2013) (on 
file with author).  Judge Harhoff further singled out ICTY President Theodor Meron for 
special criticism, asking whether “any American or Israeli officials ever exerted pressure on 
the American presiding judge . . . to ensure a change of direction?”  Id.  As a consequence of 
this correspondence, Judge Harhoff was later disqualified from the case against Vojislav 
Šešelj shortly before the judgment in that trial was scheduled for release.  See Press Release, 
Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia, Judge Harhoff Disqualified from Šešelj Case 
(Aug. 29, 2013), http://www.icty.org/sid/11357. 
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tion.  For example, the difference between the ICTY’s knowledge-
based approach to aiding and abetting and the ICC’s apparently pur-
posive approach is less consequential than the interpretive choices 
available under both approaches.  These interpretive choices are es-
pecially complex because the moral considerations underlying the 
reach of criminal liability are themselves complex.  Indeed, a princi-
pal difficulty presented by the foreign assistance cases lies in the way 
that they demand moral judgments that transcend easy encapsulation 
in the straightforward legal elements that have traditionally served to 
police the boundaries of criminal responsibility. 
In combination, these insights reveal that foreign assistance 
cases are clouded by an indeterminacy that is both inevitable and fa-
miliar to criminal law.  The challenge for international criminal law 
is to manage this indeterminacy in a way that renders the assignment 
of criminal responsibility sufficiently predictable while also main-
taining a normatively meaningful distinction between guilt and inno-
cence. 
My discussion proceeds in five parts.  Part I advances several 
critiques of the case-law methodology that tribunals have employed 
to identify the putative customary international law of complicity.  I 
argue (1) that the World War II-era cases upon which modern tribu-
nals have relied provide poor evidence of the existence of customary 
elements of aiding and abetting; (2) that even if taken as evidence of 
custom, these cases are by turns insufficiently consistent and insuffi-
ciently clear to evidence a settled understanding of aiding and abet-
ting; and (3) that various normative considerations, including the age 
of these cases, their participation in a criminal legal system that em-
braced more sweeping principles of culpability than those recognized 
today, and the need to ensure adequate protections against over-
criminalization, render the tribunals’ case-law methodology a poor 
substitute for the kind of normative analysis that the tribunals have 
declined thus far to explicitly undertake. 
Parts II through IV engage these normative dimensions of the 
foreign assistance cases through an appraisal of the legal elements 
that have played the central role in judicial and scholarly efforts to fix 
the boundaries of complicity.  I argue that there is less at stake in the 
choice of legal elements than is commonly supposed, because the 
competing approaches to aiding and abetting each leave room for 
substantial interpretive flexibility.  Moreover, the most plausible in-
terpretations of these elements are also the least determinate, suggest-
ing that the resolutions of the foreign assistance cases must inevitably 
rely on moral judgments that resist easy encapsulation.  Part II evalu-
ates the purposive approach to complicity endorsed by the Model Pe-
nal Code, by Article 25(3)(c) of the Rome Statute, and by much of 
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the U.S. ATS case law.  Part III turns to the much-debated specific 
direction standard applied in Perišić.  Part IV considers the actus reus 
requirement of substantial assistance that plays a particularly im-
portant role under approaches that require neither purpose nor specif-
ic direction. 
Part V acknowledges the problematic indeterminacy arising 
from the kind of moral judgment that, I argue, is intrinsic to aiding 
and abetting determinations and suggests ways for the law to man-
age—without eliminating—this indeterminacy.  I then conclude. 
I. THE UNBEARABLE LIGHTNESS OF PRECEDENT 
A reader of the international tribunal case law might be for-
given for thinking that identifying and applying standards of accom-
plice liability is a relatively straightforward matter.  In the absence of 
adequate statutory guidance, judges have looked to uncodified rules 
of customary international law to determine important doctrinal ques-
tions.  With respect to aiding and abetting in particular, the case law 
embraces the assumption both that this is the right approach and that 
customary international law does indeed supply the requisite an-
swers.  Hence, the courts have generally refrained from engaging in a 
normative analysis aimed at determining the most just approach to-
ward aiding and abetting.  The exercise, instead, is to discover and 
apply the existing answers already established by custom. 
International criminal tribunals have consistently treated prior 
precedents of international criminal judgments as the best evidence 
of custom.  This, for example, is the approach evidenced in the 
ICTY’s landmark Furundžija case, which marks one of the first in-
ternational convictions for aiding and abetting since World War II.37  
 
 37. See Prosecutor v. Furundžija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, Judgment, ¶ 193 (Int’l Crim. 
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 10, 1998) (“Little light is shed on the definition of 
aiding and abetting by the international instruments providing for major war trials . . . .  It 
therefore becomes necessary to examine the case law.”).  The case of Prosecutor v. Tadić, 
also at the ICTY, marked the first aiding and abetting conviction since World War II.  An 
ICTY Trial Chamber convicted the accused on several counts of aiding and abetting war 
crimes and crimes against humanity.  Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Judgment,  
¶¶ 726, 730, 735, 738 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia May 7, 1997).  As in 
Furundžija, the Trial Chamber drew extensively from the World War II-era case law.  Id.  
¶¶ 661–92.  The defense did not appeal the Trial Chamber’s legal findings regarding the law 
of aiding and abetting, but the Appeals Chamber nevertheless, without citation, laid out 
elements of aiding and abetting consistent with those that the Furundžija Trial Chamber 
would later identify, albeit also including the much debated reference to acts “specifically 
directed to . . . crime.”  Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgment, ¶ 229 (Int’l 
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 15, 1999). 
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The accused, a military commander of a special unit of Bosnian Cro-
at forces, was found guilty of having aided and abetted the rape of a 
detainee by his presence at the scene of the crime and his continued 
participation in the victim’s interrogation.38  In support of this find-
ing, the Trial Chamber consulted a number of World War II-era prec-
edents, including the judgment of the International Military Tribunal 
(IMT) at Nuremberg, the judgments of the Nuremberg Military Tri-
bunals established in the U.S. zone of occupied Germany pursuant to 
Control Council Law No. 10, and the judgments of various other mil-
itary tribunals established by the Allied states and the postwar Ger-
man government.39  Based on this review, the Furundžija Trial 
Chamber made several findings regarding the customary law of aid-
ing and abetting liability.  It ruled, for instance, that the aider or abet-
tor’s contribution to the underlying crime must be substantial, but 
need not play a causal role in the completion of the offense and, de-
pending on the circumstances, could take the form of the accused’s 
presence at the scene of the crime.40  Moreover, the aider and abettor 
need not act with a purpose to facilitate the criminal offense:  it is 
enough that the accused acted in the knowledge that he was substan-
tially assisting the crime.41 
Likewise, the Perišić and Šainović judgments both made sig-
nificant use of these same precedents.  In Perišić, the ICTY Appeals 
Chamber invoked the World War II case law in support of its own 
prior dictum in Tadić that liability for aiding and abetting requires 
proof of assistance “specifically directed” toward criminal activity.42  
In Šainović, by contrast, the Appeals Chamber declined to follow this 
portion of the Perišić judgment principally on the ground that its 
analysis of the same World War II cases found no support for a spe-
cific direction requirement.43  And, having reached that conclusion, 
the Šainović judgment evidenced no attempt to consider whether 
principles of justice might require a specific direction requirement in 
 
 38. Furundžija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, ¶¶ 274–75. 
 39. Id. ¶¶ 193–226, 236–41. 
 40. Id. ¶¶ 232–35. 
 41. Id. ¶ 249 (“The mens rea required is the knowledge that these acts assist the 
commission of the offence.”). 
 42. Prosecutor v. Perišić, Case No. IT-04-81-A, Judgment, ¶ 44 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for 
the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 28, 2013) (citing The Zyklon B Case for the proposition that 
“the provision of general assistance which could be used for both lawful and unlawful 
activities will not be sufficient, alone, to prove that this aid was specifically directed to 
crimes of principal perpetrators”). 
 43. Prosecutor v. Šainović, Case No. IT-05-87-A, Judgment, ¶¶ 1627–42 (Int’l Crim. 
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Jan. 23, 2014). 
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the kinds of foreign assistance cases exemplified by Perišić.  Other 
international criminal tribunals, along with several ATS precedents, 
have likewise relied on these precedents (either directly or by refer-
ence to ICTY case law) to determine the elements of aiding and abet-
ting liability.44 
In this Part, I challenge the view that standards of accomplice 
liability can or should be determined in the manner that these judg-
ments have assumed.  My claim is both descriptive and prescriptive.  
As a descriptive matter, it is mistaken to believe that consultation of 
the prior case law reveals a customary international law of accom-
plice liability that is sufficient to ground international convictions 
without further analysis regarding the appropriate scope of aiding and 
abetting liability.  As a normative matter, moreover, the methodology 
adopted by the tribunals is ill-suited toward securing a just approach 
to criminal responsibility. 
A. The Custom of Nuremberg 
At the outset, there are several reasons for skepticism that the 
World War II-era judgments could have benefited from settled cus-
tomary elements of accomplice liability.  Establishing a norm of cus-
tomary international law requires widespread state practice accompa-
nied by a sense of legal obligation (opinio juris).45  Yet different 
legal systems embrace different approaches to accomplice liability in 
their own domestic law.46  Can one really expect that, by the time the 
 
 44. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Kayishema & Ruzindana, Case No. ICTR-95-1-A, 
Judgment, ¶ 186 (June 1, 2001) (citing to ICTY precedents); Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. 
SCSL-03-01-A, Judgment, ¶¶ 403–27 (Sept. 26, 2013) (surveying the World War II-era 
cases). 
 45. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38(1)(b), June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 
1055 [hereinafter ICJ Statute] (specifying that the International Court of Justice shall apply, 
inter alia, “international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law”); 
Michael Wood (Special Rapporteur), Int’l Law Comm’n, Second Rep. on Identification of 
Customary International Law, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/672, ¶ 20 (May 22, 2014) (“‘Customary 
international law’ means those rules of international law that derive from and reflect a 
general practice accepted as law.”); id. ¶ 52 (“[F]or a rule of general customary international 
law to emerge or be identified the practice need not be unanimous (universal); but, it must be 
extensive or, in other words, sufficiently widespread.”) (internal quotations and citations 
omitted); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES  
§ 102(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1986) (“Customary international law results from a general and 
consistent practice of states followed by them from a sense of legal obligation.”). 
 46. See, e.g., Šainović, Case No. IT-05-87-A, ¶ 1644 (“As a common basis, for aiding 
and abetting liability to arise, national legislation and the jurisprudence of domestic courts 
require the provision of assistance or support which facilitates the commission of a crime.   
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victorious Allies established the first international criminal tribunals 
in history, the international community had already reached wide-
spread agreement on special, common rules of accomplice liability 
for these international crimes?  The implausibility of this suggestion 
is underscored by the fact that consideration of the Nuremberg era 
remains dominated by discussion of retroactivity:  neither crimes 
against humanity nor aggression—both prosecuted by the original 
IMTs and various military tribunals—had a history as offenses that 
were punishable under international law.47  Quite clearly, the Allied 
commitment to prosecution was not one to be deterred by positivist 
anxieties about insufficient authority in existing law. 
The reported judgments from this era confirm the broad ex-
tent to which convictions relied more on judicial creativity than es-
tablished law to resolve the fine points of individual accountability.  
Take, for example, the Schonfeld case,48 which is one of several de-
cided by the British Military Courts to receive prominent attention in 
the recent cases.49  The Court convicted four members of the German 
 
However, national jurisdictions conceptualise the link between the acts of assistance and the 
crime in the context of actus reus and the required degree of mens rea in various different 
ways in accordance with principles in their respective legal systems.”); Taylor, Case No. 
SCSL-03-01-A, ¶¶ 429–30 (stating that “the reliance by the Defence on examples of 
domestic jurisdictions requiring or applying a ‘purpose’ standard to an accused’s mental 
state regarding the consequence of his acts or conduct is misplaced,” and that “[t]he Appeals 
Chamber equally identifies a number of States that explicitly provide that an accused’s 
knowledge of the consequence of his acts or conduct is culpable mens rea for aiding and 
abetting liability”). 
 47. See, e.g., Christian Tomuschat, The Legacy of Nuremberg, 4 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 
830, 832 (2006) (“The list of offences under the jurisdiction of the IMT was also denounced 
as having no solid foundation in international law.  The Statute of the IMT provided, in the 
first place, for crimes against peace and, in particular, criminalized war of aggression 
(Article 6(a)).”).  Particular criticism has focused on the prosecution of aggression, labeled 
“crimes against peace.”  In its final judgment, the Nuremberg IMT famously pronounced 
that “the maxim nullum crimen sine lege is not a limitation of sovereignty, but is in general a 
principle of justice.”  Judgment, in 1 TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE 
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL 171, 219 (1947) [hereinafter United States v. Göring et 
al.].  The judgment also invoked the 1928 Kellogg-Briand Pact to counter the claim that 
accountability for crimes against peace entailed ex post facto punishment.  See id. at 219–20.  
As Tomuschat notes, “This reasoning was far from convincing.  It is one thing to declare war 
unlawful with regard to inter-state relationships, but a totally different thing to acknowledge 
it as an offence entailing individual criminal responsibility.”  Tomuschat, supra, at 833. 
 48. See generally Case No. 66, Trial of Franz Schonfeld and Nine Others, in 11 
UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES COMMISSION LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS 64 
(1949) [hereinafter Schonfeld]. 
 49. Prosecutor v. Furundžija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 200–02 (Int’l 
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 10, 1998); Šainović, Case No. IT-05-87-A,  
¶ 1629. 
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Security Police for their alleged role in the 1944 killing of three 
downed Allied airmen who had taken refuge in a private residence in 
the Dutch town of Tilburg.50  Like other British cases, Schonfeld did 
not produce a reasoned judgment, but the U.N. War Crimes Commis-
sion (UNWCC) report of the case quotes from the Judge Advocate’s 
instructions to the Tribunal, including his “set[ting] out the law relat-
ing to accessories, and aiders and abettors.”51  The report reveals no 
attempt to ground this law in international legal sources.  The legal 
standards are simply announced, and the UNWCC report confirms 
that the Judge Advocate drew upon principles of English law.52  For 
this reason, the ICTY’s Furundžija judgment distinguishes the Brit-
ish Military Court cases from other Nuremberg-era precedents, cau-
tioning that “unless otherwise provided, the law applied was domes-
tic, thus rendering the pronouncements of the British courts less 
helpful in establishing rules of international law on this issue.”53 
Although the Furundžija Trial Chamber correctly identifies 
Schonfeld’s apparent failure to apply international standards of ac-
complice liability, it draws the wrong lesson from that failure.  As the 
UNWCC report reflects, the resort to domestic law was evidently a 
gap-filling measure reflecting international law’s own failure to pro-
vide sufficient guidance on crucial doctrinal matters.  The intention 
“was not to try the accused for offences against English law but 
simply to amplify and define the charge against them” considering 
both “the present state of vagueness prevailing in many branches of 
the law of nations,” and “the fact that there are no binding precedents 
in International Law.”54  Hence, the commentary concludes, “such 
introduction therein of tested concepts from municipal systems is all 
to the good, provided that they are recognised to be in amplification 
of, and not in substitution for, rules of International Law.”55  Contra-
ry to the ICTY’s assumption, the British cases do indeed provide 
strong evidence regarding customary international law:  they evi- 
 
 
 50. Schonfeld, supra note 48, at 64–67. 
 51. See id. at 69. 
 52. See id. at 69–70 (quoting the Judge Advocate’s summary of “the law relating to 
accessories, and aiders and abettors”); id. at 72–73 (discussing the Judge Advocate’s reliance 
on English law). 
 53. Furundžija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, ¶ 196.  The Furundžija Trial Chamber did, 
nevertheless, rely on the British judgments, reasoning that “there is sufficient similarity 
between the law applied in the British cases and [other cases] under Control Council Law 
No. 10 for these cases to merit consideration.”  Id.  
 54. Schonfeld, supra note 48, at 72. 
 55. Id.  
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dence the law’s general silence on the elements of aiding and abet-
ting. 
Perhaps the most remarkable aspect of the Schonfeld case is 
that the Judge Advocate went so far as to summarize the elements.  
Other cases—including the judgments delivered in U.S. occupied ar-
eas, which the Furundžija Chamber treats as more reliable—do not 
go so far.  The judicial practice evidenced by these judgments is 
simply to apply summarily stated legal standards without providing 
any basis of authority whatsoever or even a basic summary of the ap-
plicable elements.  For instance, in the Flick case, two defendants 
were convicted for contributing large sums to the financing of the SS 
with knowledge of the group’s criminal activities.56  Noting the SS’s 
role in the mass extermination of Jews, among other crimes, the Tri-
bunal reasoned that “[a]n organization which on a large scale is re-
sponsible for such crimes can be nothing else than criminal,” and that 
“[o]ne who knowingly by his influence and money contributes to the 
support thereof must, under settled legal principles, be deemed to be, 
if not a principal, certainly an accessory to such crimes.”57  Yet no-
where does the Tribunal identify the source of these “settled legal 
principles.”  Reaching a seemingly opposite conclusion, the IMT 
found it equally obvious in the Ministries case that a banker respon-
sible for loaning large sums of money to various criminal SS enter-
prises was not on that basis responsible as a participant in those 
crimes despite his knowledge of the uses to which his assistance was 
being put.58  That determination likewise fails to cite any underlying 
law.  Nor, indeed, do any of the other World War II-era precedents 
cited by the international criminal tribunals provide evidence of any 
customary basis for aiding and abetting rules under international law.  
The inescapable conclusion is that the judges in these cases simply 
assessed the defendants’ culpability based on the criminal law princi-
ples with which the judges happened to be familiar, or based on their 
own intuitive judgments about what justice required. 
The idea, then, that the World War II-era cases applied pre-
established customary rules is far-fetched.  But perhaps the defense 
of these cases must proceed in a different manner.  Perhaps their 
claim to customary legitimacy derives from events in subsequent 
 
 56. The Flick Case, supra note 9, at 23–24, 1216–23. 
 57. Id. at 1217. 
 58. See generally 14 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUERNBERG MILITARY 
TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO. 10:  “THE MINISTRIES CASE” 621–22 (1949–
1953) [hereinafter The Ministries Case] (finding defendant Karl Rasche not guilty of war 
crimes and crimes against humanity on the basis of these bank loans).  Rasche was, however, 
convicted on another count unrelated to these loans.  See id. at 772–84. 
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years, from the international community’s post hoc approval of the 
Nuremberg moment.  Indeed, the notion that international law has at 
some level ratified at least some of these cases is uncontroversial.  
This approval began early, even as the World War II cases were still 
being decided.  In 1946, during its very first session and only weeks 
after the Nuremberg IMT had delivered its final judgment, the U.N. 
General Assembly unanimously passed a resolution “affirm[ing] the 
principles of international law recognized by the Charter of the 
Nürnberg Tribunal and the judgment of the Tribunal” and directing 
the Assembly’s codification committee to treat the codification of 
those principles “as a matter of primary importance.”59  The next 
year, the U.N. General Assembly directed the newly established In-
ternational Law Commission (ILC) to undertake this codification ef-
fort, leading the ILC to produce, in 1950, a list of seven “Nuremberg 
Principles,”60 and, in 1954, a nonbinding Draft Code of Crimes 
Against the Peace and Security of Mankind.61  The Nuremberg lega-
cy has seen further affirmation in recent decades with the establish-
ment of various additional tribunals charged with prosecuting inter-
national offenses. 
Taken together, these and other developments provide strong 
support for the view that many principles of international criminal 
law have entered into customary international law, and indeed the 
prohibitions against genocide, crimes against humanity, and war 
crimes are often cited as examples of jus cogens obligations from 
which no derogation is permitted.62  But it would be implausible to 
maintain that this ratification entailed the acceptance of every doctri-
nal detail appearing in the case reports of the World War II-era 
judgments.  The ILC’s Nuremberg Principles, for instance, operate at 
a much higher level of generality, identifying crimes that are punish-
able under international law and stating certain core principles of lia-
bility, such as the fact that international crimes incur individual re-
sponsibility and that neither official capacity nor superior orders 
 
 59. G.A. Res. 95 (Dec. 11, 1946). 
 60. Principles of International Law Recognized in the Charter of the Nürnberg 
Tribunal and in the Judgment of the Tribunal, U.N. Doc. A/1316 (1950), reprinted in [1950] 
2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 374, ¶ 97, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1950/Add.1. 
 61. Draft Code of Offences Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, U.N. Doc. 
A/2693 (1954), reprinted in [1954] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 149, U.N. Doc. 
A/CN.4/SER.A/1954/Add.1 [hereinafter ILC, 1954 Draft Code]. 
 62. See, e.g., M. Cherif Bassiouni, International Crimes:  Jus Cogens and Obligatio 
Erga Omnes, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 63, 68 (1996)  (“The legal literature discloses that 
the following international crimes are jus cogens:  aggression, genocide, crimes against 
humanity, war crimes, piracy, slavery and slave-related practices, and torture.  Sufficient 
legal basis exists to reach the conclusion that all these crimes are part of jus cogens.”).  
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supply a defense.  The seventh and final principle deals with accom-
plice liability.  It states, “Complicity in the commission of a crime 
against peace, a war crime, or a crime against humanity as set forth in 
Principle VI is a crime under international law,” but says nothing 
about the forms and elements of complicity.63 
The ILC’s 1954 Draft Code likewise fails to identify the ele-
ments of complicity,64 although a later draft produced in 1996 does 
specify that an individual “shall be responsible for a crime [listed in 
the Draft Code] if that individual . . . [k]nowingly aids, abets or oth-
erwise assists, directly and substantially, in the commission of such a 
crime, including providing the means for its commission.”65  Several 
judgments have cited this provision, alongside the World War II-era 
case law, as evidence of a customary standard,66 but the accompany-
ing ILC commentary does not purport to identify rules of customary 
international law.67  Moreover, when only two years later 120 states 
approved the final text of the Rome Statute of the ICC, they agreed 
upon a different aiding and abetting standard than the one endorsed 
by the ILC.68 
 
 63. Principles of International Law Recognized in the Charter of the Nürnberg 
Tribunal and in the Judgment of the Tribunal, supra note 60, at 377.  Even with respect to 
these core principles, moreover, the ILC declined to opine on whether they formed part of 
international law.  See id. at 378. 
 64. ILC, 1954 Draft Code, supra note 61, at art. 2(12)(iv) (defining as “offences 
against the peace and security of mankind” those “[a]cts which constitute . . . [c]omplicity in 
the commission of any of the offences defined in the preceding paragraphs of this article”). 
 65. Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind with 
Commentaries, U.N. Doc. A/51/10 (1996), reprinted in [1996] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 18, 
art. 2(3)(d), U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1996/Add.1 (Part 2) [hereinafter ILC, 1996 Draft 
Code]. 
 66. See Prosecutor v. Furundžija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, Judgment, ¶ 187 (Int’l Crim. 
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 10, 1998); Prosecutor v. Šainović, Case No. IT-05-87-
A, Judgment, ¶ 1647 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Jan. 23, 2014); Prosecutor 
v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-A, Judgment, ¶ 428 (Sept. 26, 2013). 
 67. Instead, it specifies that: 
The principle of individual criminal responsibility for complicity in the 
commission of a crime set forth in subparagraph (d) is consistent with the 
Charter of the Nürnberg Tribunal (art. 6), the Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (art. III, subpara. (e)), the statute of the 
International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (art. 7, para. 1) and the statute 
of the International Tribunal for Rwanda (art. 6, para. 1).  This principle is also 
consistent with the Nürnberg Principles (Principle VII) and the 1954 draft Code 
(art. 2, para. 13 (iii)). 
ILC, 1996 Draft Code, supra note 65, at 21. 
 68. See infra note 118 and accompanying text; Furundžija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, 
¶ 227 (“[T]he Rome Statute by and large may be taken as constituting an authoritative 
expression of the legal views of a great number of States.”). 
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A more plausible account of the Nuremberg legacy would 
acknowledge that a core of international criminal law has entered into 
customary international law, but that, from the very beginning, the 
system has necessarily relied on judicial discretion to elaborate many 
of the rules necessary to assign criminal liability. 
B. Inconsistent Precedents 
A separate problem has to do with the internal coherence of 
the World War II-era cases.  That is, even if one treats those cases as 
unproblematic evidence of customary international law, they never-
theless fail, on their terms, to provide a lucid and consistent account 
of accomplice liability.69 
1. Mens Rea 
Take, for instance, the mental element of complicity.  A num-
ber of World War II-era decisions appear to support the ICTY’s con-
clusion that knowledge of one’s contribution to an offense satisfies 
the mental element required for conviction.  But closer scrutiny of 
these decisions reveals a more complicated picture.  In some cases, 
the judges simply applied the complicity standards operative in their 
own respective legal systems.  This is the case, for instance, with a 
 
 69. That the World War II-era cases have proven inconsistent on some points of law is 
uncontroversial.  For instance, in Prosecutor v. Erdemović, a plurality of the ICTY Appeals 
Chamber found the cases to be conflicted on whether duress could ever afford a complete 
defense to murder as a war crime or crime against humanity.  See Prosecutor v. Erdemović, 
Case No. IT-96-22-A, Joint Separate Opinion of Judge McDonald and Judge Vohrah, ¶ 55 
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 7, 1997) (“In light of the above discussion, 
it is our considered view that no rule may be found in customary international law regarding 
the availability or the non-availability of duress as a defence to a charge of killing innocent 
human beings.  The post-World War Two military tribunals did not establish such a rule.  
We do not think that the decisions of these tribunals or those of other national courts and 
military tribunals constitute consistent and uniform state practice underpinned by opinio 
juris sive necessitatis.”).  Accordingly, when the Tribunal rejected the accused’s duress 
defense, it did so on policy grounds rather than on the basis of a pre-existing customary rule.  
Id. ¶ 88 (“After the above survey of authorities in the different systems of law and 
exploration of the various policy considerations which we must bear in mind, we take the 
view that duress cannot afford a complete defence to a soldier charged with crimes against 
humanity or war crimes in international law involving the taking of innocent lives.  We do 
so having regard to our mandated obligation under the Statute to ensure that international 
humanitarian law, which is concerned with the protection of humankind, is not in any way 
undermined.”).  With respect to complicity, however, recent case law has provided a 
somewhat-misleading sense of precedential consensus. 
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pair of French military tribunal cases cited in Šainović, which applied 
a French Penal Code provision assigning culpability to “[t]hose who 
knowingly have aided or assisted the perpetrator.”70  And in the Pig-
Cart Parade case, decided by the German Supreme Court in the Brit-
ish occupied zone, the Court applied the broader approach familiar to 
German law according to which dolus eventualis—roughly analo-
gous to the common law concept of recklessness—satisfies the men-
tal element of complicity.71  On the other hand, the Judge Advocate’s 
instructions in the aforementioned Schonfeld case appear to endorse 
the more purposive approach to complicity that is familiar to com-
mon law systems.72 
In some cases, moreover, judicial statements about mens rea 
are clouded by uncertainty regarding what form of accomplice liabil-
ity is involved.  Schonfeld itself provides a good example of this phe-
nomenon.  The Judge Advocate provided instructions not only on 
aiding and abetting liability but also on so-called common design lia-
bility.  This latter mode of liability is a form of enterprise liability, 
 
 70. Trial of Franz Holstein and Twenty-Three Others, in 8 LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS OF 
WAR CRIMINALS 22, 33 (1949).  See generally Trial of Robert Wagner, Gauleiter and Head 
of the Civil Government of Alsace During the Occupation, and Six Others, in 3 LAW 
REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS 23 (1948). 
 71. Strafsenat, Urteil vom 14 Dezember 1948 gegen L. und andere, StS 37/48 (Pig-
Cart Parade Case), in 1 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES OBERSTEN GERICHTSHOFS FÜR DIE BRITISCHE 
ZONE IN STRAFSACHEN 229–34 (1949).  On dolus eventualis, see Markus D. Dubber, 
Criminalizing Complicity:  A Comparative Analysis, 5 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 977, 992–93 
(2007) (noting that dolus eventualis has a “subjective aspect[] which requires indifference 
toward, or perhaps even acceptance of, the chance that a proscribed result might occur,” and 
an “objective aspect . . . which requires the creation of a risk not rising to the level of virtual 
certainty,” and further concluding that “[n]o matter how one looks at dolus eventualis, it is 
clear that it is not knowledge, or dolus indirectus, even though it may not quite be 
recklessness either”). 
 72. Take for example, the Judge Advocate’s discussion of the aider and abettor who is 
present at the scene of the crime—and is thus punishable as a “principal in the second 
degree” under the traditional common law rule.  Schonfeld, supra note 48, at 70.  The 
instructions provide that “if he is outside the house, watching, to prevent a surprise, or the 
like, whilst his companions are in the house committing a felony, such a constructive 
presence is sufficient to make him a principal in the second degree . . . but he must be near 
enough to give assistance.”  Id. (emphasis added).  The instructions further clarify that: 
It is not necessary . . . to prove that the party actually aided in the commission 
of the offence; if he watched for his companions in order to prevent surprise, or 
remained at a convenient distance in order to favour their escape, if necessary, 
or was in such a situation as to be able readily to come to their assistance, the 
knowledge of which was calculated to give additional confidence to his 
companions, he was, in contemplation of law, present, aiding and abetting. 
Id. (emphasis added).  As such, the ICTY’s Furundžija judgment may have been too quick 
in its assessment that Schonfeld endorses knowledge-based aiding and abetting.  Furundžija, 
Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, ¶ 239. 
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permitting the conviction of those who did not aid or abet the murder 
of the airmen so long as those murders were in furtherance of a 
common criminal design in which the accused participated.73 
This type of accomplice liability is well-known to the U.S. le-
gal system, where the federal courts and many states follow the so-
called Pinkerton approach, pursuant to which parties to a conspiracy 
can be convicted as accomplices for all foreseeable crimes committed 
by their co-conspirators in furtherance of the conspiracy.74  In an in-
fluential precedent, the ICTY Appeals Chamber likewise recognized 
that an accused’s participation in a so-called “joint criminal enter-
prise” (JCE) renders the accused responsible for all foreseeable 
crimes within the Tribunal’s jurisdiction that are committed in fur-
therance of the JCE.75  As described by the Judge Advocate in Schon-
feld, common design liability involves a combination of purpose and 
knowledge.  The common design itself must reflect an illegal pur-
pose, but individual participants may be convicted based on their 
knowing participation in that design.76 
The UNWCC report of Schonfeld does not indicate which 
theory of accomplice liability provided the basis of decision for the 
various convicted accomplices.  A similar ambiguity also compli-
cates the consideration of other cases that did produce reasoned 
judgments.  For instance, the Einsatzgruppen case, one of the Control 
Council Law No. 10 prosecutions heard by a U.S. military tribunal in 
Nuremberg, focused on leaders of SS paramilitary units responsible 
for mass killings in German occupied territories.77  The Furundžija 
 
 73. Schonfeld, supra note 48, at 68 (“In our law if several persons combine for an 
unlawful purpose or for a lawful purpose to be effected by unlawful means, and one of them, 
in carrying out the purpose, kills a man, it is murder in all who are present, whether they 
actually aid or abet or not, provided that the death was caused by a member of the party in 
the course of his endeavours to effect the common object of the assembly.”). 
 74. Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 647–48 (1946). 
 75. Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgment, ¶¶ 188–93 (Int’l Crim. Trib. 
for the Former Yugoslavia July 15, 1999).  The ICTR, the SCSL, and the STL have also 
embraced this doctrine as well.   
 76. Schonfeld, supra note 48, at 68 (“You will therefore ask yourselves the question:  
What was the object of this assembly in or about Diepenstraat 49?  Was it an assembly to 
commit murder, or was it an assembly to effect arrests?  If the former, did the members of 
the assembly know the purpose for which they were there, and if the purpose was the crime 
of murder, did they participate in the design to murder?”).  Notably, the ICTY’s Tadić 
judgment adopts a narrower approach to enterprise liability, one that requires members of 
the common plan to share the group’s criminal purpose.  Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-
94-1-A, Judgment, ¶ 220 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 15, 1999). 
 77. See generally The Einsatzgruppen Case—Opinion and Judgment, in 4 TRIALS OF 
WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS 411 (1949–1953) 
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judgment relies on Einsatzgruppen for the point that “knowledge, ra-
ther than intent, was held to be the requisite mental element,”78 yet 
the relevant portions of the Einsatzgruppen judgment suggest that the 
Tribunal was not relying on aiding and abetting principles but instead 
applying special rules of liability applicable to participants in a com-
mon criminal design.  For instance, with respect to defendant 
Fendler, the Tribunal emphasizes that the defendant “knew that exe-
cutions were taking place,” while doing nothing to stop them.79  The 
Tribunal reaches this conclusion after noting the prosecution’s argu-
ment that, while Fendler never conducted an execution, “it is main-
tained that he was part of an organization committed to an extermina-
tion program.”80  Yet the Tribunal’s emphasis on Fendler’s high rank 
and his guilt by omission suggest yet a third theory of responsibility, 
one rooted in a commander’s special responsibility to control his 
subordinates.  The Tribunal notes that as “the second-highest ranking 
officer in the Kommando, his views could have been heard in com-
plaint or protest against what he now says was a too summary proce-
dure, but he chose to let the injustice go uncorrected.”81 
These reflections appear to reflect the Tribunal’s reliance—
evident in both Einsatzgruppen and other Nuremberg Military Tribu-
nal judgments—on a provision of Control Council Law No. 10 au-
thorizing the conviction of those who “took a consenting part” (TCP) 
in a war crime or crime against humanity.82  Heller explains that “the 
tribunals considered TCP either to be another name for participating 
in a criminal enterprise or—more interestingly—as a sui generis 
mode of participation in a crime similar to, but not equivalent with 
command responsibility.”83  By contrast, “The tribunals . . . ad-
dressed abetting solely in the context of enterprise liability, consider-
ing defendants who had executed a criminal enterprise to have abet-
ted it.”84 
There are, however, at least two cases in which judges from 
 
[hereinafter The Einsatzgruppen Case]. 
 78. Prosecutor v. Furundžija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, Judgment, ¶ 237 (Int’l Crim. 
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 10, 1998). 
 79. See The Einsatzgruppen Case, supra note 77, at 572. 
 80. Id. at 571. 
 81. Id. at 572.   
 82. Control Council Law No. 10, supra note 19, at art. II(2); KEVIN JON HELLER, THE 
NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS AND THE ORIGINS OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 259 
(2011). 
 83. HELLER, supra note 82, at 259–60. 
 84. Id. at 287. 
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common law legal systems do appear to endorse a knowledge-based 
approach to aiding and abetting.  In the Zyklon B case, a British Mili-
tary Court convicted two executives of a firm that supplied poison 
gas to extermination camps.85  The Judge Advocate instructed that 
conviction could rest on a finding that “the accused knew that the gas 
was to be used for the purpose of killing human beings,” even if the 
accused did not share this criminal purpose.86  Likewise, in Flick, one 
of the Nuremberg Military Tribunal cases, the Tribunal convicted 
two of the accused on charges of having contributed funds used to 
support the SS.  As I have already noted, the Tribunal reasoned in 
that case, “One who knowingly by his influence and money contrib-
utes to the support [of an organization which on a large scale is re-
sponsible for war crimes and crimes against humanity] must, under 
settled legal principles, be deemed to be, if not a principal, certainly 
an accessory to such crimes.”87  Even these cases, however, are po-
tentially distinguishable on the grounds that they involve aiding and 
abetting of a criminal enterprise:  the defendants were convicted of 
providing assistance to the SS, which the Nuremberg IMT had al-
ready determined to be a criminal organization.88 
2. Substantiality of Assistance 
The precedents also tell a mixed story regarding the actus reus 
of complicity.  The modern ad hoc tribunals have invoked World 
War II-era cases to support the rule that the aider and abettor’s ac-
tions must provide assistance that has a substantial effect on the prin-
cipal’s crimes.89  Yet many of the passages cited in these judgments 
do not straightforwardly address the substantiality of assistance, and 
some appear instead to stand for the more modest proposition that the 
aider and abettor must merely assist the offense in some way.90  Nor, 
 
 85. The Zyklon B Case, supra note 8, at 93–103. 
 86. Id. at 101. 
 87. The Flick Case, supra note 9, at 1217. 
 88. See infra notes 179–81 and accompanying text. 
 89. Prosecutor v. Furundžija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 218–26 (Int’l 
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 10, 1998); Prosecutor v. Šainović, Case No. IT-
05-87-A, Judgment, ¶ 1642 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Jan. 23, 2014) 
(“The criteria employed in these cases were rather whether the defendants substantially and 
knowingly contributed to relevant crimes.”). 
 90. For the citations, see infra notes 179–81 and accompanying text.  For the passages, 
see, for example, The Einsatzgruppen Case, supra note 77, at 569 (noting with respect to the 
accused Klingelhoefer, that even if his only function had been to act as an interpreter “it 
would not exonerate him from guilt because in locating, evaluating and turning over lists of 
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indeed, is it clear in all cases that the convicted accomplice did in fact 
substantially assist the offense.  For instance, in the Rohde case, a 
British tribunal convicted a prisoner at the Natzweiler-Struthof con-
centration camp for the murder by lethal injection of four British 
prisoners where the accused’s sole apparent role was to work the ov-
en used to cremate the victims’ bodies post-execution.91  Although 
one can readily think of cases where disposal of a body substantially 
assists a crime by helping to conceal the offense from the authorities, 
conceptualizing cremation as a form of aiding and abetting is far 
more tenuous in a case like Rohde where the authorities themselves 
have undertaken the execution and there is no imperative to conceal.  
The quotations from the Judge Advocate’s instructions provided in 
the brief case report give no attention to this question. 
3. Specific Direction 
Finally, the World War II-era precedents also provide less 
guidance on the divisive question of specific direction than the recent 
case law would suggest.  The judgments rejecting this standard cor-
rectly observe that none of the early cases mention specific direction 
as an element of aiding and abetting,92 yet the vast majority of these 
 
Communist party functionaries to the executive department of his organization he was aware 
that the people listed would be executed when found”); id. at 572 (“As the second highest 
ranking officer in the Kommando, [Fendler’s] views could have been heard in complaint or 
protest against what he now says was a too summary procedure, but he chose to let the 
injustice go uncorrected.”); id. at 585 (“Since there is no evidence in the record that Graf 
was at any time in a position to protest against the illegal actions of others, he cannot be 
found guilty as an accessory under counts one and two [war crimes and crimes against 
humanity] of the indictment.”); The Zyklon B Case, supra note 8, at 102 (reporting the Judge 
Advocate’s instructions that the accused Drosihn’s responsibility turns on “whether there 
was any evidence that he was in a position either to influence the transfer of gas to 
Auschwitz or to prevent it.  If he were not in such a position, no knowledge of the use to 
which the gas was put could make him guilty”); Modes of Participation in Crimes Against 
Humanity, The Hechingen and Haigerloch Case, 7 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 131, 131–48 (2009); 
Furundžija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, ¶ 225 n.250 (quoting The Hechingen Case, which states 
that “[i]t is irrelevant that if a single accused or all of them had refused to co-operate, the 
search would have been carried out by the other accused or by somebody else”). 
 91. Case No. 31, Trial of Werner Rohde and Eight Others, in 5 U.N. WAR CRIMES 
COMM’N, LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS 54, 54–56 (1948). 
 92. Šainović, Case No. IT-05-87-A, ¶¶ 1627–42; Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. 
SCSL-03-01-A, Judgment, ¶ 474 (Sept. 26, 2013) (“The Appeals Chamber has 
independently reviewed the post-Second World War jurisprudence, and is satisfied that those 
cases did not require an actus reus element of ‘specific direction’ in addition to proof that the 
accused’s acts and conduct had a substantial effect on the commission of the crimes.”).  
Note, however, that the ILC’s 1996 Draft Code does specify that the aider or abettor must 
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cases do not raise the problem—encountered in Perišić—of general-
ized or so-called “neutral” assistance provided to a recipient who us-
es it for both legitimate and illegitimate purposes. 
Again, however, Zyklon B and Flick appear to be exceptions.  
In the former case, the accused argued, inter alia, that they had sup-
plied insecticide to the SS for the legitimate purpose of delousing 
buildings.93  The Judge Advocate instructed that the Tribunal could 
convict based on a finding “that the accused knew that the gas was to 
be used for the purpose of killing human beings.”94  Even here, the 
instructions do not distinguish between a scenario in which the ac-
cused knew that all of the gas was to be used for killing human be-
ings, and one in which the accused knew that only some or much of it 
was to be so used.  Nevertheless, it would be odd to summarize the 
issues in this way if the law demanded an exclusively criminal pur-
pose.95 
In the Flick case, moreover, the Tribunal did acknowledge the 
probability that not all the accused’s financial donations to the per-
sonal use of SS commander Heinrich Himmler went to illegitimate 
ends.  The judgment finds it “reasonably clear” that a portion of the 
funds “were used purely for cultural purposes,” but nevertheless jus-
tifies the conviction of Flick and Steinbrinck on the grounds that they 
could not “reasonably believe” that their contributions were used 
“solely for cultural purposes.”96  The Tribunal further expressed “no 
doubt” that “some of this money” was used in support of criminal ac-
 
“directly and substantially” assist the principal’s crime, but it does not elucidate what is 
meant by the word “directly.”  See ILC, 1996 Draft Code, supra note 65 and accompanying 
text. 
 93. The Zyklon B Case, supra note 8, at 94 (“The prosecuting Counsel, in his opening 
address, stated that Dr. Bruno Tesch was by 1942 the sole owner of a firm known as Tesch 
and Stabenow, whose activities were divided into three main categories.  In the first place, it 
distributed certain types of gas and gassing equipment for disinfecting various public 
buildings, including Wehrmacht barracks and S.S. concentration camps.  Secondly, it 
provided, where required, expert technicians to carry out these gassing operations.  Lastly, 
Dr. Tesch and Dr. Drosihn, the firm’s senior gassing technician, carried out instruction for 
the Wehrmacht and the S.S. in the use of the gas which the firm supplied.  The predominant 
importance of these gassing operations in war-time lay in their value in the extermination of 
lice.”). 
 94. Id. at 101. 
 95. The ICTY Appeals Chamber’s discussion of specific direction in the Perišić case 
includes a footnote citing evidence in Zyklon B that evidence “that defendants arranged for 
S.S. units to be trained in using this gas to kill humans in confined spaces.”  Prosecutor v. 
Perišić, Case No. IT-04-81-A, Judgment, ¶ 44 n.115 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former 
Yugoslavia Feb. 28, 2013). 
 96. The Flick Case, supra note 9, at 1220. 
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tivity.97  Given its broadest reading, this language conveys a breath-
takingly broad view of criminal liability according to which a donor 
is criminally liable for a mere negligent failure to realize that some 
portion of a financial contribution will be directed by the recipient 
toward criminal ends.  Yet other passages caution against such a 
broad reading.  I have previously quoted language indicating that the 
Tribunal was focused only on knowing assistance of crimes.98  
Hence, perhaps what the judgment really means to say is that defend-
ants must have known, and hence did know, of the uses to which 
their contributions were put.  Moreover, the Tribunal also took the 
position that any use of the accused’s contributions for legitimate cul-
tural activities was likely insignificant during the wartime period.99 
But the Zyklon B and Flick cases are also noteworthy on ac-
count of the fact that they deal with assistance to the SS, an entity 
that the IMT had determined to be a criminal organization.100  This 
fact plays a central role in the reasoning of Flick, as the Tribunal de-
termined it to be “clear from the evidence that [Flick and Stein-
brinck] gave to Himmler, the Reich Leader SS, a blank check.  His 
criminal organization was maintained and we have no doubt that 
some of this money went to its maintenance.  It seems to be immate-
rial whether it was spent on salaries or for lethal gas.”101  In the 
Zyklon B case, the accused directly supplied the SS with insecti-
cide.102 
For this reason, Heller has argued that Zyklon B is compatible 
with Perišić.  In particular, he notes that “the SS was not an organi-
zation that was engaged in lawful and unlawful activities.  On the 
contrary, all of the SS’s activities were unlawful, which is precisely 
why the IMT specifically deemed it a criminal organization.”103  As I 
explore below, there are some complications with this argument—in 
particular the IMT’s assessment of the SS as a criminal organization 
 
 97. Id.  
 98. See supra note 87 and accompanying text. 
 99. The Flick Case, supra note 9, at 1220 (“But during the war and particularly after 
the beginning of the Russian campaign we cannot believe that there was much cultural 
activity in Germany.”). 
 100. See supra note 88 and accompanying text. 
 101. The Flick Case, supra note 9, at 1221. 
 102. The Zyklon B Case, supra note 8, at 98 (noting defense counsel’s acknowledgment 
that “supplies of Zyklon B to the S.S. were large”). 
 103. Kevin Jon Heller, The Specific-Direction Requirement Would Not Have Acquitted 
the Zyklon-B Defendants, OPINIO JURIS (Aug. 19, 2013), http://opiniojuris.org/2013/08/19/ 
no-specific-direction-would-not-have-acquitted-the-zyklon-b-defendants/ (emphasis in 
original). 
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does not appear to have rested on a negative finding that the SS re-
frained from all criminal activity (and indeed any such finding would 
have been mistaken)104—but nevertheless this argument suggests a 
way to read both the Zyklon B and Flick cases that is broadly con-
sistent with Perišić’s specific direction requirement.  The outcome of 
Zyklon B does not offend specific direction, because any support for a 
criminal enterprise such as the SS was necessarily illegitimate, 
whereas the narrowest reading of Flick supports, at best, a de mini-
mis exception to the specific direction requirement in cases where an 
insignificant portion of assistance is directed toward legitimate ends. 
C. Normative Concerns 
There are, finally, several compelling normative reasons to 
exercise caution when relying upon the World War II-era cases.  First 
of all, the age of the decisions should give pause.  The dearth of prec-
edents during the Cold War years raises concerns that modern inter-
national criminal law has become overly dependent upon what is now 
seventy-year-old criminal law, ignoring intervening reforms at the 
domestic level.  According to the practice set by the ICTY in Tadić, 
international tribunals may rely on national legal standards, but only 
after meeting a high threshold:  national criminal law can provide a 
source of international law “under the doctrine of the general princi-
ples of law recognised by the nations of the world,” but for it to play 
this role “it would be necessary to show that most, if not all, coun-
tries adopt the same notion . . . .  More specifically, it would be nec-
essary to show that, in any case, the major legal systems of the world 
take the same approach.”105 
Second, there is the problem of “victor’s justice.”  The World 
War II era saw the Allies invoke international criminal law for the 
exclusive purpose of prosecuting crimes committed on behalf of the 
defeated Axis powers, raising concerns that these judgments do not 
reflect the same commitment to protecting the accused as would have 
accompanied an evenhanded approach that held both winners and 
losers to the same legal standards.106 
 
 104. See infra notes 176–79 and accompanying text. 
 105. Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgment, ¶ 225 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the 
Former Yugoslavia July 15, 1999).   
 106. The Furundžija judgment exemplifies this danger when it remarks with respect to 
the Rohde case that “In the case of one of the accused, assistance ex post facto was found to 
be sufficient for criminal responsibility.  As this was not the position under English law, the 
inference is warranted that the court applied a different law to these international crimes.”  
Prosecutor v. Furundžija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, Judgment, ¶ 204 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the 
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And whether or not the World War II-era judgments reflect 
actual judicial bias, they do embrace a more expansive approach to 
criminal liability than that which prevails today.  For instance, the 
knowledge-based form of enterprise liability endorsed in 
Einsatzgruppen and many other cases is broader than the modern 
JCE doctrine, according to which the accused must share the criminal 
purpose of the enterprise.107  The IMTs embraced an analogue to 
command responsibility, which extends more broadly than does the 
contemporary command responsibility doctrine.108  But most dra-
matic of all is the prohibition—enshrined in the statutes of the Nu-
remberg and Tokyo IMTs, as well Control Council Law No. 10—of 
mere membership in a “criminal organization.”109  Although the 
judgment of the IMT at Nuremberg narrowed the prohibition to cover 
only those members who were both aware of the organization’s crim-
inal purposes or acts and had joined voluntarily, even this reduced li-
ability—which requires no contribution toward or endorsement of the 
organization’s crimes—extends the reach of international criminal 
law far beyond what contemporary international legal practice has 
embraced.110 
This aspect of the World War II-era case law should give 
pause to contemporary jurists confronting other forms of liability, 
such as aiding and abetting, that do remain part of contemporary in-
ternational criminal law.  Indeed, it is predictable that a legal regime 
 
Former Yugoslavia Dec. 10, 1998).  In context, the statement appears to treat this divergence 
from English law as evidence that the British Military Court applied a special rule of 
international law, one that enhances the case’s authority as an authentic international legal 
precedent rather than simply a national law precedent.  Yet, one might be equally tempted to 
conclude that this divergence simply reflected the judges’ willingness to dispense with 
national law protections that proved inexpedient. 
 107. See Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-A, ¶ 220. 
 108. See HELLER, supra note 82, at 259. 
 109. London Charter, supra note 19, at art. 10 (“In cases where a group or organization 
is declared criminal by the Tribunal, the competent national authority of any Signatory shall 
have the right to bring individuals to trial for membership therein before national, military or 
occupation courts.  In any such case the criminal nature of the group or organization is 
considered proved and shall not be questioned.”); Control Council Law No. 10, supra note 
19, at art. II (recognizing “as a crime . . . [m]embership in categories of a criminal group or 
organization declared criminal by the International Military Tribunal”). 
 110. United States v. Göring et al., supra note 47, at 256 (“Since the declaration with 
respect to the organizations and groups will, as has been pointed out, fix the criminality of its 
members, that definition should exclude persons who had no knowledge of the criminal 
purposes or acts of the organization and those who were drafted by the State for 
membership, unless they were personally implicated in the commission of acts declared 
criminal by Article 6 of the Charter as members of the organization.  Membership alone is 
not enough to come within the scope of these declarations.”). 
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committed to the punishment of mere membership in an organization 
would—and indeed, should—also take a broad view of accomplice 
liability.  It would seem incongruous for the Flick judgment to con-
clude that defendant Flick’s membership in the SS was grounds for 
punishment but that his and defendant Steinbrinck’s substantial con-
tributions to a fund administered by the SS’s Reichsleader were not.  
If anything, the financial contributions would appear to reflect greater 
blameworthiness on account of the tangible assistance they offered 
the SS’s crimes.  But this observation does not speak to the question 
of whether, and when, such contributions should give rise to criminal 
liability in a legal regime—such as the contemporary international 
criminal justice system—that rejects membership as a basis of prose-
cution. 
Finally, the nature of criminal justice demands special caution 
when precedents are invoked to defeat arguments to restrain the 
scope of criminal liability.  Punishment involves a deprivation of in-
dividual liberty, and the adjudication of particular cases always risks 
an application of established law that leads to injustices neither fore-
seen nor intended by the general rule.  As George Fletcher has recog-
nized, the prohibition on retroactive punishment should not “preclude 
the judicial recognition of new claims of excuse and justification.”111  
That concern applies with special force to international criminal law, 
where the international legal system affords no ready legislative fix 
for statutory deficiencies.  Amending the rules of liability imposed by 
the Rome Statute of the ICC, for instance, requires ratification by 
seven-eighths of the treaty’s 124 States Parties.112  And to establish 
new rules of customary law requires widespread practice among 
states.113  Accordingly, international criminal tribunals are to a large 
extent dependent on judges to adopt interpretive strategies and to ex-
ercise their available discretion in a manner that prevents injustice.  
The idea that important protections for the accused not recognized in 
the World War II-era case law must await this level of widespread 
agreement is indefensible. 
None of this is to argue that precedents are irrelevant to the 
field of international criminal law.  To the contrary, resort to prece-
dential authority can play an important role in promoting legality 
values such as ensuring fair notice and reducing the risk of arbitrary 
judicial action.  Likewise, it can provide an especially compelling ar-
 
 111. GEORGE P. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 569–70 (1978).  For similar 
reasons, Heller has argued that the specific direction requirement does not violate the 
legality principle despite its lack of a customary basis.  See Heller, supra note 103. 
 112. Rome Statute, supra note 28, at art. 121(4). 
 113. See supra note 45 and accompanying text. 
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gument against expanding criminal responsibility beyond previously 
established boundaries.  But the reliance on World War II-era prece-
dents cannot serve as a substitute for normative analysis, especially 
regarding the limits of criminal responsibility.  The next Part turns to 
these normative considerations. 
II. PURPOSE 
There are many ways to contribute to a crime without becom-
ing criminally responsible.  Consider the hypothetical example of 
parents who learn that their daughter, an adult university student 
studying computer science, is engaged in illegal computer hacking.  
The parents express their strong disapproval but nevertheless contin-
ue to financially support their child by paying for tuition, living ex-
penses, and basic necessities.  Or, even more implausibly, imagine 
that the parents are not providing this assistance but nevertheless con-
tributed to the crime more distantly by deciding to procreate while 
knowing full well that, in the normal course of events, their child 
will, at some point in her life, do something that violates criminal 
law.114  In both of these examples one can accurately describe the 
parents as making a contribution, even a knowing contribution, to 
their daughter’s criminal offenses, yet no just system of law would 
treat them as culpable participants in the child’s crime. 
It is the task of complicity law to distinguish between those 
contributions to crime that are punishable and those that are not, and 
also—in many legal systems—to distinguish between varying de-
grees of criminal guilt.115  As the debate over specific direction re-
veals, different legal systems and different international criminal tri-
 
 114. James G. Stewart, Overdetermined Atrocities, 10 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 1189, 1208 
(2012) (noting that such examples “extend causation beyond the point of plausibility”); 
MARKUS D. DUBBER & TATJANA HÖRNLE, CRIMINAL LAW:  A COMPARATIVE APPROACH 301 
(2014) (noting with respect to the case of People v. Kibbe, 35 N.Y.2d 407 (1974), that “if the 
owner of the tavern in Rochester where victim and offenders met would not have opened his 
establishment, or if [the perpetrator’s] parents had chosen not to have children, the incident 
would not have occurred as it did . . . [b]ut causal antecedents of this kind hardly are 
sufficient to attribute criminal responsibility”). 
 115. In international legal circles, significant debate has focused on how to grade the 
culpability of the blameworthy.  For instance, the ICTY’s JCE approach labels all 
contributing members of a criminal enterprise as principal perpetrators in the foreseeable 
crimes committed in furtherance of the enterprise.  By contrast, the ICC’s “control theory” 
approach to co-perpetration treats as principal perpetrators only those who have made 
“essential contributions” to the enterprise.  Non-essential contributors must be prosecuted, if 
at all, as accomplices.   
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bunals have taken a range of approaches on these questions.  In the 
remainder of this Article, I consider and evaluate how these different 
approaches impact the scope of liability in foreign assistance cases 
like Perišić. 
I begin by considering the purposive approach to aiding and 
abetting, which seeks to prevent the overextension of criminal re-
sponsibility through a narrow mens rea requirement.  In the United 
States, for example, the influential Model Penal Code provides, “A 
person is an accomplice of another person in the commission of an 
offense if . . . with the purpose of promoting or facilitating the com-
mission of the offense, he . . . aids or agrees or attempts to aid such 
other person in planning or committing it.”116  The codes and case 
law of several other common law jurisdictions include similar lan-
guage,117 as does the Rome Statute, which assigns criminal responsi-
bility to one who, “For the purpose of facilitating the commission of 
[a crime within the Court’s jurisdiction], aids, abets or otherwise as-
sists in its commission or its attempted commission, including 
providing the means for its commission.”118 
Anthony Duff has justified the commitment to purpose-based 
complicity by reference to a political libertarianism that informs the 
common law’s general reluctance to punish people for mere omis-
sions.119  On this view, the store clerk who sells screwdrivers to pay-
ing customers is merely going about her usual business and need not 
interrupt this ordinary course of conduct when approached by a pay-
ing customer who announces his intention to use the screwdriver in a 
burglary.  To require otherwise, argues Duff, would be to impose an 
affirmative obligation on citizens to prevent crimes, an obligation at 
odds with the common law’s traditional rejection of a general duty to 
rescue.120  A line is crossed, however, when the clerk actively aims to 
 
 116. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06(3) (AM. LAW INST. 1962). 
 117. In Šainović, the ICTY Appeals Chamber cited the examples of Australia, Canada, 
Ghana, Israel, and England.  See Prosecutor v. Šainović, Case No. IT-05-87-A, Judgment,  
¶ 1645 nn.5417–18 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Jan. 23, 2014). 
 118. Rome Statute, supra note 28, at art. 25(3)(c); see also Sarah Finnin & Nema 
Milaninia, Putting “Purpose” in Context, JAMES G. STEWART (Dec. 7, 2014), 
http://jamesgstewart.com/putting-purpose-in-context (“Article 25(3)(c) echoes the approach 
originally developed by the American Law Institute in its Model Penal Code (‘MPC’), which 
requires that an accomplice act ‘with the purpose of promoting or facilitating the 
commission of the offense.’”). 
 119. See generally R. A. Duff, “Can I Help You?”  Accessorial Liability and the 
Intention to Assist, 10 LEGAL STUD. 165 (1990).  
 120. Id. at 178 (“Those who favour the latter option can argue that it accords with other 
central features of English criminal law, in particular with the principle that omissions or 
failures to prevent harm can found criminal liability only if the agent has a special duty of 
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further the customer’s criminal designs, for example by advising on 
which particular screwdriver is best suited to accomplish the intended 
burglary or instructing on how exactly to employ the tool.121  The 
clerk has now acted with an affirmative purpose to aid the offender 
and may be punished accordingly. 
As a prima facie matter, Duff’s account provides a compel-
ling defense of the purposive approach, at least to the extent that one 
shares Duff’s concern about punishing omissions.  Other prominent 
scholars have voiced similar cautions about a knowledge-based aid-
ing and abetting122 and the commentary to the Model Penal Code de-
fends its purposive standard along similar lines.123  But the adequacy 
of this account—and its implications for particular cases—depends 
very much on how the requirement is understood.  What exactly does 
it mean to act purposefully, and to which elements of the principal 
offender’s offense must the accomplice’s purpose extend? 
At common law and in early criminal codes, the answer to 
this question was shrouded in ambiguity both because the law relied 
on the ambiguous concept of “intent,” which lacked a settled mean-
ing, and because of a tendency to identify mens rea in general terms 
without always specifying the mental requirements for each individu-
al element of an offense.124  A major contribution of the Model Penal 
 
care as to that harm or its victim.”).   
 121. Duff makes this point in the context of a gun sale, noting that “[t]o ascribe an 
intention to assist P’s commission of an offence to D, we would need to show that the sale 
was not simply a normal commercial transaction:  that, for instance, D helped P to select an 
appropriate gun for his purposes, or charged him a special price.”  Id. at 172. 
 122. See GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW:  THE GENERAL PART 373 (2d ed. 1961) 
(“The seller of an ordinary marketable commodity is not his buyer’s keeper in criminal law 
unless he is specifically made so by statute.”); FLETCHER, supra note 111, at 676 (“From the 
standpoint of the supplier, the problem of refusing services to known criminals closely 
resembles the problem of intervening to prevent impending harm.  The grocery store, the gas 
station, the physician, the answering service all provide routine services.  Does the business-
person have a duty to make an exception just because he or she knows that the purchaser is 
engaged in illegal activity?”).  But see generally Sanford H. Kadish, Reckless Complicity, 87 
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 369 (1997) (defending accomplice liability based on 
recklessness). 
 123. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06 cmt. at 315–16 (AM. LAW INST. 1962) (“A lessor rents 
with knowledge that the premises will be used to establish a bordello.  A vendor sells with 
knowledge that the subject of the sale will be used in the commission of a crime. . . .  An 
employee puts through a shipment in the course of his employment though he knows the 
shipment is illegal. . . .  Such cases can be multiplied indefinitely; they have given courts 
much difficulty when they have been brought, whether as prosecutions for conspiracy or for 
the substantive offense involved.”).  
 124. See Paul H. Robinson & Jane A. Grall, Element Analysis in Defining Criminal 
Liability:  The Model Penal Code and Beyond, 35 STAN. L. REV. 681, 683 (1983) 
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Code was to introduce greater precision on these points, but as I dis-
cuss below, it failed in critical ways to clarify the mens rea applicable 
to accomplice liability.125  Moreover, individual U.S. states continue 
to follow a range of approaches to accomplice liability.126 
A. Purpose as to All Elements 
Under the strictest interpretation, culpability for aiding and 
abetting would require an accomplice to fully embrace all elements 
of the principal offender’s crime, “positively to desire,” in James 
Stewart’s words, “the criminal outcome her assistance helps to bring 
into the world.”127  This view comports with how the Model Penal 
Code generally defines purposeful conduct on the part of a principal 
 
(“American criminal law has advanced significantly towards providing . . . precision, clarity, 
and rationality, owing in large part to the Model Penal Code.  The common law and older 
codes often defined an offense to require only a single mental state.  Under this ‘offense 
analysis,’ one spoke of intentional offenses, reckless offenses, and negligent offenses.  The 
general culpability provisions of the Model Penal Code, in contrast, recognize that a single 
offense definition may require a different culpable state of mind for each objective element 
of the offense.”).  Reflecting these ambiguities, English case law, for example, has divided 
on whether accomplices must actually desire to promote the criminal acts of principal 
perpetrators.  See Duff, supra note 119, at 165–66 (observing that “[a]iding and abetting 
requires an ‘intention’ to assist the commission of the relevant offence” and surveying the 
split between, on the one hand, English cases holding that an accomplice has “that intention 
just so long as she acts in a way which she knows will facilitate the commission of the 
offence,” and, on the other hand, Scottish cases and some English cases, finding that 
intention requires more than mere knowledge); NEHA JAIN, PERPETRATORS AND ACCESSORIES 
IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW:  INDIVIDUAL MODES OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR COLLECTIVE 
CRIMES 161 (2014) (“There is controversy over whether [an accessory] must possess a 
mental attitude with respect to the offence going beyond mere awareness and actually intend 
the offence to occur . . . [and] [t]he bulk of English authorities support the conclusion that 
D’s knowledge that his act will assist is sufficient.”).  In the United States, by contrast, the 
majority position is that purpose, rather than knowledge, is required.  See Paul H. Robinson, 
Imputed Criminal Liability, 93 YALE L.J. 609, 637 n.100 (1984) (“The defendant must have 
either a purpose to assist or encourage or, in some jurisdictions, simply have knowledge of 
the fact that he is assisting or encouraging.  The majority of United States codes require 
purposeful or intentional assistance.”).  
 125. See Paul H. Robinson & Markus D. Dubber, The American Model Penal Code:  A 
Brief Overview, 10 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 319, 335 (2007) (“In its zeal to clarify the law, the 
Model Penal Code even excised the words ‘intent’ and ‘intention’ from its terminology, 
concepts that in spite (or perhaps partly because) of their ambiguity had assumed a central 
place in the criminal law of the United States, as well as of many other countries.”). 
 126. See generally John F. Decker, The Mental State Requirement for Accomplice 
Liability in American Criminal Law, 60 S.C. L. REV. 237 (2008).  
 127. James G. Stewart, Complicity, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CRIMINAL LAW 534, 
551 (Markus D. Dubber & Tatjana Hörnle eds., 2014) [hereinafter Stewart, Complicity]. 
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offender who “acts purposely with respect to a material element of an 
offense when[,] . . . if the element involves the nature of his conduct 
or a result thereof, it is his conscious object to engage in conduct of 
that nature or to cause such a result.”128 
The obvious attraction of this approach lies in its protection 
against over-criminalization.  Imagine, for example, that Perišić had 
disbursed arms to Bosnian Serb forces with precise instructions that 
tied the procurement of continued aid to the continued perpetration of 
atrocities.  In such a case, the dilemmas of “specific direction” disap-
pear.  That Perišić might have known or even desired that the benefi-
ciaries of his assistance would devote a portion of this support to le-
gitimate combat functions is hardly relevant.  By working to promote 
these atrocities, Perišić made them his own, reducing the need for 
further doctrinal protections against an overly expansive accomplice 
liability. 
This is not to say, however, that a strict purpose requirement 
avoids all risk of over-criminalization.  Consider the citizen that 
complies with her general legal duty to pay taxes in the knowledge 
that a portion of the revenue will end up supporting government cor-
ruption.  Imagine that the taxpayer happens to endorse this corruption 
and finds it to be a decisive reason to avoid tax evasion.  Or imagine 
a variation on Perišić, in which a government official is responsible 
for overseeing an otherwise-permissible foreign aid program.  The 
official knows that a small portion of the assistance will find its way 
to recipients who perpetrate atrocities, and the official has volun-
teered for this work precisely because he wants to support these 
atrocities.  Nevertheless, the official undertakes his work in a neutral 
matter, performing his duties exactly as he might if he did not em-
brace this purpose.  As these admittedly fanciful examples illustrate, 
even a strict mens rea requirement may be insufficient—without oth-
er legal protections—to ground criminal responsibility in cases of 
minor or attenuated contributions to criminal activity. 
Nevertheless, the far more substantial problem with this strict 
approach is that it is under-inclusive, leading to well-known arbitrary 
distinctions between accomplices and principal perpetrators.  Stewart 
gives the example of a person who, acting without justification, 
throws a grenade into a passing car, knowing to a virtual certainty 
that the explosion will kill someone inside.129  The grenade explosion 
 
 128. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(a)–(a)(i) (AM. LAW INST. 1962) (emphasis added).  
The Code further provides that the offender acts purposely with respect to background facts, 
or so-called “attendant circumstances,” if “he is aware of their existence or he believes or 
hopes that they exist.”  MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(a)(ii) (AM. LAW INST. 1962).  
 129. Stewart, Complicity, supra note 127, at 556. 
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does indeed kill the car’s occupants and the perpetrator (whom I will 
name Sid) is guilty of murder.130  Whether or not Sid acted with the 
express purpose to kill is irrelevant.  It might be, for example, that the 
car’s driver has just taken an embarrassing photograph that Sid wants 
to destroy, and that it is all the same to him whether or not any of the 
car’s occupants survive the explosion.  This non-homicidal purpose 
fails to exonerate in light of Sid’s awareness that his actions were vir-
tually certain to result in death.  Indeed, even something less than vir-
tual certainty will be sufficient to support a homicide conviction—if 
not for murder, then for a lower grade of homicide. 
Suppose, now, that Sid is assisted by an accomplice, Nancy, 
who passes him the grenade after pulling the pin.  Suppose, moreo-
ver, that Nancy knows full well what Sid intends to do, but is person-
ally indifferent regarding whether or not Sid plans to throw the gre-
nade into the passing vehicle or, instead, into a nearby pond where it 
will safely explode without risk to human life.  What reason is there, 
in a case like this, to convict Sid of murder on the ground that he was 
aware of the certain consequences of his action, but to absolve his 
accomplice, Nancy, on the ground that her identical knowledge does 
not amount to a purpose to take human life? 
Different versions of this scenario—both hypothetical and re-
al-life—have played a prominent role in scholarly and judicial criti-
cism of the strictly purposive approach.131  Notably, this scenario 
does not benefit from the rationale commonly invoked to defend a 
purpose requirement.  Handing a live grenade to a would-be murder-
 
 130. This result follows from the common law requirement of malice aforethought, see, 
for example, Regina v. Serné, 16 Cox. Crim. Cas. 311 (1887), reprinted in AUGUSTIN 
DERBY, CASES ON CRIMINAL LAW 342 (1917) (“The definition [of murder] is unlawful 
homicide with malice aforethought; and the words malice aforethought are technical. . . .  
[One] meaning is, an act done with the knowledge that the act will probably cause the death 
of some person.”) and from the Model Penal Code’s approach to homicide, see MODEL 
PENAL CODE § 210.2 (AM. LAW INST. 1962) (providing, inter alia, that “criminal homicide 
constitutes murder when . . . it is committed purposely or knowingly”). 
 131. Glanville Williams, for instance, cites a similar example in support of the 
proposition that the mens rea required to prosecute aiders and abettors may sometimes be 
looser than for principal perpetrators.  See WILLIAMS, supra note 122, at 394 (“It seems that 
even where a crime requires intention on the part of the perpetrator, intention need not be 
proved against a secondary party if he knowingly involves himself in the affair.  Thus:  D is 
about to kill P, and requests E to hand him a weapon with which to do it; E hands him the 
weapon, not because he wishes P to die, but because he always likes to oblige D.  E is 
clearly a party to the murder if he knows of D’s intention.  In this respect, the mental 
element required for secondary parties is more widely defined than the mental element 
required for the perpetrator.”); see, e.g., United States v. Fountain, 768 F.2d 790 (7th Cir. 
1985) (rejecting the purposive approach to complicity in the case of an inmate who provided 
the knife to a fellow inmate, which was used to murder a guard). 
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er has little to do with selling everyday products in the ordinary 
course of business.  Nor is it intuitive to describe culpability of such 
an accomplice as a form of guilt by omission.  Accordingly, to the 
extent that the “ordinary conduct of business” argument provides a 
persuasive reason to reject some kinds of knowledge-based complici-
ty, this argument does not cover all cases. 
B. The Conduct/Result Distinction 
This arbitrary under-inclusiveness provides a compelling rea-
son to reject the strictest version of the purposive approach.  Indeed, 
that is what jurisdictions that embrace a purpose requirment have 
done.  In some instances, the elements of aiding and abetting are sup-
plemented by other, more expansive forms of liability that either 
formally expand accomplice liability132 or have the practical effect of 
doing so.133  But even putting those examples aside, the commitment 
to intentional complicity itself has taken a more nuanced form, one 
resting on a distinction between the perpetrator’s criminal actions and 
the results of those actions.  What is critical under this approach is 
 
 132. For instance, many jurisdictions apply the so-called Pinkerton rule, which treats 
co-conspirators as accomplices to all crimes committed in furtherance of the conspiracy, 
including foreseeable offenses outside the common plan.  See Pinkerton v. United States, 
328 U.S. 640 (1946).  Some jurisdictions follow a similar rule for aiders and abettors outside 
the context of conspiracy, holding them responsible for the “probable and natural 
consequences” of their assistance, including crimes not intended by the accomplice.  See 
People v. Luparello, 187 Cal. App. 3d 410 (1986).  Although both doctrines require the 
accomplice to embrace some sort of criminal intent, they operate to hold accomplices 
responsible for crimes outside the scope of their intended assistance. 
 133. New York state, for example, supplements its rules of accessorial liability by 
codifying the offense of criminal facilitation, which prohibits the aiding of a crime by one 
“believing it probable he is rendering aid.”  N.Y. PENAL LAW, § 115.  Although criminal 
facilitation is a distinct offense rather than a form of participation in another offense, the 
effect is to penalize certain non-purposeful forms of criminal assistance.  At the federal 
level, well known facilitation offenses include the crime of material support to terrorism (18 
U.S.C.A. § 2339B) and money laundering (18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1956–57).  When applicable, 
these statutes assign liability even more broadly than New York’s facilitation offense in that 
they require neither a purposeful contribution to crime nor an actual contribution to crime.  
For instance, it is a crime to “knowingly provide[] material support or resources to a foreign 
terrorist organization,” irrespective of whether that support assists the criminal activities of 
the organization.  18 U.S.C.A. § 2339B; see Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 
1, 36 (2010) (interpreting 18 U.S.C.A. § 2339B to prohibit training “on how to use 
humanitarian and international law to peacefully resolve disputes”).  With respect to money 
laundering, it is a criminal offense to knowingly engage in certain transactions involving 
money from an illegal source regardless of whether the transaction itself helps to assist or 
conceal the underlying illegal activity.  18 U.S.C.A. § 1957. 
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that the accomplice purposefully assists the perpetrator’s criminal 
conduct.  So long as the accomplice does so, she may be held respon-
sible for the completed crime even if she does not have as her con-
scious object the realization of any prohibited harm. 
Consider the following scenario:  Jill is driving her car at ex-
cessive speeds through a crowded city street, paying no attention to 
the traffic signs.  Jack is in the passenger seat, constantly encourag-
ing her to drive faster.  Both exhibit extreme recklessness regarding 
the risk that Jill will fatally injure someone, as she indeed does when 
the car strikes a pedestrian.  On account of her recklessness, Jill is 
convicted of manslaughter.  Is Jack also guilty as an accomplice to 
manslaughter?  Under the strict purposive approach, the answer is no.  
Jack had no purpose to aid homicide and is therefore not responsible 
for the devastating fruits of the behavior he encouraged.  But Jack did 
act with a purpose to encourage Jill’s culpable behavior, the reckless 
driving itself, and—just like Jill—he has exhibited extreme reckless-
ness regarding the fatal result that transpired.  Courts in the United 
States and England have convicted accomplices under these circum-
stances.134  The operative fact is that Jack purposefully encouraged 
Jill’s criminal conduct (her high-speed driving) while possessing the 
same mens rea regarding the potential loss of human life (reckless-
ness) that the law finds sufficient to convict Jill as a principal perpe-
trator. 
The Model Penal Code reaches the same result; it specifies, 
“When causing a particular result is an element of an offense, an ac-
complice in the conduct causing such result is an accomplice in the 
commission of that offense if he acts with the kind of culpability, if 
any, with respect to that result that is sufficient for the commission of 
the offense.”135  Hence, jurisdictions that have adopted the Code lan-
guage on complicity would also convict Jack under the above-
described circumstances. 
This distinction has special importance for the ICC, whose 
Statute tracks the Model Penal Code in providing for the punishment 
 
 134. LUIS E. CHIESA, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW:  CASES, COMMENTS AND 
COMPARATIVE MATERIALS 314 (2014) (“[M]any—if not most—American jurisdictions hold 
that an actor may be held liable as an accomplice to an unintentional offense such as 
involuntary manslaughter.  Properly understood, this does not dispense with the traditional 
requirement that the accomplice purposefully encourage the commission of the crime.  
Rather, it clarifies that the accomplice need only purposefully assist, facilitate, or encourage 
the conduct that gives rise to the offense.”); WILLIAMS, supra note 122, at 361–62 (“[I]f two 
riders or drivers encourage each other to go fast, each is responsible for a negligent killing 
by the other.”). 
 135. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06(4) (AM. LAW INST. 1985). 
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of those who provide assistance “[f]or the purpose of facilitating the 
commission” of a crime.136  Unlike the Code, however, the Rome 
Statute does not define the word “purpose,” nor does it specify how 
much of the underlying offense must fall within the accomplice’s 
purpose or otherwise endorse the Model Penal Code’s conduct/result 
distinction.  But the Statute’s debt to the Model Penal Code’s purpos-
ive language provides a powerful argument that the Rome Statute 
likewise embraces that framework.137  A recent online symposium 
hosted by Stewart indicates that this interpretation of the Rome Stat-
ute has gained substantial currency among international criminal law 
scholars.138 
What, however, are the implications of this framework for the 
foreign assistance cases?  The answer is not entirely clear.  There is, 
it appears, instability in the conduct/result distinction itself.139  Take, 
for example, the case of Nancy, the grenade-passing accomplice.  
Nancy’s assistance is clearly purposive in the sense that she acted 
with the object of facilitating Sid’s request for the grenade.  Howev-
er, as hypothesized, Nancy did not act with a deliberate purpose to 
assist Sid’s throwing of the grenade into the car itself:  she is merely 
aware of Sid’s lethal plan.  If one treats Sid’s procuring of the gre-
nade as part of his criminal conduct, then the conduct/result distinc-
tion will support Nancy’s conviction.  After all, Nancy acted with a 
purpose to facilitate that portion of Sid’s conduct.  If, on the other 
hand, one treats only Sid’s throwing of the grenade as the relevant act 
for purposes of his murder conviction, then Nancy’s help to Sid in 
procuring the grenade is insufficient for accomplice liability. 
 
 136. See Rome Statute, supra note 28, at art. 25(3)(c). 
 137. See Adil Ahmad Haque, The U.S. Model Penal Code’s Significance for Complicity 
in the ICC Statute:  An American View, JAMES G. STEWART (Dec. 13, 2014), 
http://jamesgstewart.com/the-u-s-model-penal-codes-significance-for-complicity-in-the-icc-
statute-an-american-view (adopting this view).  
 138. See James G. Stewart, An Important New Orthodoxy on Complicity in the ICC 
Statute?, JAMES G. STEWART (Jan. 21, 2015), http://jamesgstewart.com/the-important-new-
orthodoxy-on-complicity-in-the-icc-statute/#comments (identifying support for an 
“important new orthodox interpretation of complicity in the ICC Statute” that rests on the 
conduct/result distinction).  But see Kevin Jon Heller, Comment to An Important New 
Orthodoxy on Complicity in the ICC Statute?, JAMES G. STEWART (Jan. 24, 2015, 6:44 PM), 
http://jamesgstewart.com/the-important-new-orthodoxy-on-complicity-in-the-icc-statute/ 
#comments (arguing that a soldier who hands to a fellow solider a weapon used to execute 
civilians is not guilty of purposeful aiding and abetting under the Rome Statute absent 
evidence that the alleged accomplice intended to facilitate the shooting of the victims). 
 139. See Robinson & Grall, supra note 124, at 706 (“A major defect of the Model Penal 
Code is its failure to define adequately the three kinds of objective elements of an offense—
that is, to distinguish conduct, circumstance, and result elements.”). 
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The latter scenario is problematic because it preserves the ar-
bitrary distinction according to which the virtual certainty of death 
convicts Sid but not Nancy.  The former scenario—which treats Sid’s 
procuring of the grenade as part of his criminal conduct—produces 
the more satisfying disposition of Nancy’s guilt.  It also provides 
some support for the view that government officials who intentional-
ly provide material assistance to the perpetrators of mass atrocities 
can also be held accountable, even under a purpose standard, based 
on their knowledge of how the recipients plan to use that assistance.  
In particular, it could support the conviction of defendants like Tay-
lor and Perišić on the ground that they purposefully aided the procur-
ing of support by recipients who planned to use that support toward 
illicit ends. 
The problem with going down this line, however, is that it 
threatens to render the purposive approach near meaningless because 
it will produce convictions in the “ordinary course of business” cases 
the Model Penal Code standard was ostensibly designed to ex-
clude.140  Consider again the hardware store clerk who sells a screw-
driver to a customer who has announced his plan to use the tool in a 
burglary.  The clerk treats the burglar like any other customer, yet the 
same interpretive maneuvers that enable Nancy’s conviction for mur-
der will also enable the clerk’s conviction for burglary.  Just like 
Nancy, the clerk has purposefully aided the perpetrator’s attempt to 
procure a tool that the clerk knows the perpetrator intends to use to 
commit a crime.  This application nearly eliminates the distinction 
between purposive aiding and abetting and knowledge-based aiding 
and abetting. 
Ultimately, then, the conduct/result distinction does less work 
than one might suppose.  Given the pliability involved in determining 
the scope of the offender’s conduct, distinctions between these dif-
ferent scenarios must ultimately rely on other criteria.  Perhaps the 
conduct/result distinction simply serves to mask underlying value 
judgments about the appropriate reach of criminal law.  One can say 
that Nancy has purposely aided Sid’s crime, and that the screwdriver-
selling shopkeeper has not purposely aided burglary, but really what 
one is doing is making a determination that the clerk has engaged in 
morally appropriate behavior that conforms with community norms 
while Nancy has not. 
 
 140. See supra note 123 and accompanying text. 
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C. Ordinary Course of Business 
If the conduct/result distinction fails to adequately limit the 
purposive approach, might some other principle provide a more reli-
able guide?  One option is to take seriously the oft-cited concern 
about interrupting the ordinary course of business and to explicitly 
consider whether or not the alleged assistance merely takes the form 
of an ordinary course of business, or what German criminal theorists 
describe as “neutral acts.”141  If it does, then the actor has not pur-
posely aided a crime.142  On the other hand, an actor who goes out of 
his way to provide assistance to the principal, thereby deviating from 
an ordinary course of business, is criminally responsible under the 
purposive approach. 
Duff gives the example of a hardware store clerk who breaks 
the ordinary course of business by not only selling a tool to a would-
be burglar, but by advising on which particular tools are best suited 
to the burglar’s criminal intentions.  Even in that case, as Duff points 
out, one need not assume that the clerk is rooting for his customer’s 
success:  “[The] shopkeeper who advises a customer that this screw-
driver or this weed-killer will best serve his criminal purpose intends, 
and tries, to assist his crime, even if her reason for acting thus is not 
to ensure that the crime is committed, but simply to make a profit.”143 
Perhaps one could explain the case of Sid and Nancy in simi-
lar terms.  There is nothing normal—at least not among civilians in 
peacetime—about handing a grenade over to a would-be killer.  To 
demand that Nancy act otherwise does not offend any legitimate lib-
erty interest in the way that punishing the screwdriver-selling clerk 
might.  This rationale only goes so far, however, and it has less clear 
implications for the foreign assistance cases.  In the first place, there 
is the question of what counts as an ordinary course of business.  Are 
government officials directing the provision of military aid to armed 
groups in other countries merely conducting an ordinary course of 
business that renders them unaccountable for how they know their 
 
 141. See JAIN, supra note 124, at 194. 
 142. For precedents reasoning along these lines, see, for example, Doe v. Nestle, S.A., 
748 F. Supp. 2d 1057, 1089–90, 1091, 1094–96 (C.D. Cal. 2010); id. at 1090 (“Regardless 
of whether the holdings are categorized as turning on the defendant’s actus reus or the mens 
rea, the ultimate conclusion is clear:  ordinary commercial transaction[s], without more, do 
not violate international law.”); The Ministries Case, supra note 58, at 622 (“Loans or sale of 
commodities to be used in an unlawful enterprise may well be condemned from a moral 
standpoint and reflect no credit on the part of the lender or seller in either case, but the 
transaction can hardly be said to be a crime.”). 
 143. Duff, supra note 119, at 170. 
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assistance will be used?  Perhaps, but framing the matter in this way 
is not especially illuminating.  After all, there is little analogy be-
tween this case and that of the store clerk who sells general goods to 
anonymous paying customers.  Decisions regarding the distribution 
of military support are quite particularized, involving judgments re-
garding the specific goals to be served by providing particular sup-
port to particular recipients.  Taylor’s support for the RUF and 
AFRC, like Perišić’s support for the VRS, hinged on his endorsement 
of at least some of the group’s goals and activities.144  In cases where 
the donor knows that the recipient plans to use the assistance to 
commit international crimes, perhaps it makes sense to hold the do-
nor to a more demanding standard of responsibility. 
Yet viewing the issue in this way fails to capture what makes 
these cases so difficult.  The central problem remains that in some 
situations the pursuit of legitimate and desirable goals demands the 
provision of assistance that will unavoidably contribute in some way 
to crime.  Consideration of these cases requires a moral judgment that 
is not reducible to the assessment of whether or not the conduct in 
question reflects an ordinary course of business. 
Furthermore, some very compelling cases for conviction will 
involve what can reasonably be described as an ordinary course of 
business.  Consider the Zyklon B scenario of the distributor who sup-
plies insecticide to Nazi extermination camps.  It may well be that 
this supply requires no conscious deviation from the firm’s general 
business practice of selling its product to willing customers.145  Yet, 
that fact would seem to count for quite little once the firm’s business 
has come to focus primarily on the supply of lethal gas for use in 
mass murder. 
The acquittal of Karl Rasche in the Ministries case is also 
troubling in this respect, because it highlights the risk that an ordi-
nary course of business rationale will unduly privilege business activ-
 
 144. See supra note 23 and accompanying text. 
 145. Arguing along these lines, Sabine Michalowski critiques the attempt of the court in 
Doe v. Nestle to distinguish the non-culpable bank loans in Ministries from the culpable 
behavior in Zyklon B on the ground that Zyklon B did not involve ordinary commercial 
practices.  See generally Sabine Michalowski, No Complicity Liability for Funding Gross 
Human Rights Violations?, 30 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 451 (2012).  As Michalowski notes: 
[I]t is not obvious why the Court identified the Zyklon B case as one in which 
the business person acted in a “non-commercial, non-mutually-beneficial 
manner.”  Tesch produced and sold poisonous gas and provided training 
regarding its use for killing concentration camp inmates, which he did as a 
profitable business transaction.  The fact that these are clearly reprehensible 
actions does not deprive them of their commercial nature. 
Id. at 479. 
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ities that are morally indistinguishable from other culpable behavior.  
Can it really be that making large personal donations to the SS—as in 
Flick—is grounds for conviction, but that arranging large bank loans 
to the SS—as in Ministries—is not?146  One might argue that these 
judgments are irreconcilable, but it remains noteworthy that the rea-
soning in Ministries relies on course-of-business considerations that 
do not as readily apply to personal financial contributions.147 
One may also deny that the provision of insecticide or bank 
loans under the circumstances in Zyklon B and Ministries constitutes 
an ordinary course of business, but doing so simply confirms how 
this assessment itself depends upon a prior determination of blame-
worthiness.  As with the conduct/result distinction, then, the “ordi-
nary course of business” rationale does little to resolve the moral di-
lemmas of the foreign assistance cases. 
D. Imputed Purpose 
Thus far, my discussion has assumed knowledge of an actor’s 
mental state.  In the real world, of course, matters are more compli-
cated.  Fact finders are not mind readers, and they often must reach 
judgments about an actor’s mental state based on circumstantial evi-
dence rather than unambiguous statements of intent.  In defense of its 
purposive approach, for instance, the Model Penal Code Commentary 
argues that “often, if not usually, aid rendered with guilty knowledge 
 
 146. This is in fact how the District Court in Doe v. Nestle distinguished those cases.  
Doe, 748 F. Supp. 2d at 1089–90, 1094–96; see also Michalowski, supra note 145, at 478–
79 (“It is equally unclear to what extent the difference in outcomes in Flick and Rasche rests 
on the fact that Flick was accused of making personal financial contributions to Himmler in 
order to secure political favors, whereas Rasche was accused of making a commercial loan 
on behalf of Dresdner Bank.  For the court in Doe v. Nestle, this was indeed the decisive 
difference between the two cases.”). 
 147. The Ministries Case, supra note 58, at 622 (“A bank sells money or credit in the 
same manner as the merchandiser of any other commodity.”).  In Talisman Energy, the 
Second Circuit concluded from this acquittal that “international law at the time of the 
Nuremberg trials recognized aiding and abetting liability only for purposeful conduct,”  
Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 582 F.3d 244, 259 (2d Cir. 2009), 
but the IMT did not adopt so blanket an approach.  Instead it focused on a narrower issue:  
“The real question is, is it a crime to make a loan, knowing or having good reason to believe 
that the borrower will use the funds in financing enterprises which are employed in using 
labor in violation of either national or international law?”  The Ministries Case, supra note 
58, at 622.  Note that Rasche was also charged on account of his personal contributions to 
the same Himmler-administered fund that was at issue in Flick.  The Tribunal also acquitted 
Rasche on this count, but its reasoning here did not conflict with the legal standard adopted 
in Flick.  Unlike in the latter judgment, the Ministries found no evidence that the defendant 
knew for what the funds were being used.  Id. at 854–55. 
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implies purpose since it has no other motivation.”148  In Perišić, the 
ICTY Appeals Chamber likewise emphasized the potential im-
portance of circumstantial evidence, observing that “evidence regard-
ing an individual’s state of mind may serve as circumstantial evi-
dence that assistance he or she facilitated was specifically directed 
towards charged crimes.”149  Although the quoted language deals ex-
pressly with proof of specific direction, it applies equally to proof of 
purpose. 
On one level statements such as these merely reflect the reali-
ty that fact finding often rests on circumstantial evidence, but they al-
so highlight the possibility that actual culpability assessments may 
not adhere as rigorously to the specified legal elements as the law 
would appear to demand.  In the case of Sid and Nancy, for instance, 
the approach outlined in the Model Penal Code Commentary could 
invite a guilty determination on the grounds that, Nancy’s own ac-
count of her motivations notwithstanding, her conduct so dramatical-
ly deviated from community standards of morality that she must have 
acted with a criminal purpose.  Hence, her “guilty knowledge implies 
purpose” and has “no other motivation.”150  By contrast, in a case like 
that of the merchant who merely sells a screwdriver, a fact finder will 
be less likely to impute a criminal purpose.  Although formally it is 
the purposive mens rea requirement that must decide these cases, in 
reality the fact finding relies on broader moral judgments of the de-
fendant’s behavior. 
III. SPECIFIC DIRECTION 
The framework adopted by the ICTY in the Perišić Appeals 
judgment does not require a purposeful contribution to crime.  It al-
lows conviction for aiding and abetting based on the accomplice’s 
knowing contribution to the principal offender.151  However, it pro-
tects against over-criminalization by demanding that the accom-
plice’s actus reus takes the form of assistance that is “specifically di-
rected” toward the offense.152  In particular, the Perišić Appeals 
 
 148. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06, cmt. at 316 (AM. LAW INST. 1985). 
 149. Prosecutor v. Perišić, Case No. IT-04-81-A, Judgment, ¶ 48 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for 
the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 28, 2013). 
 150. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06, cmt. at 316 (AM. LAW INST. 1985). 
 151. Perišić, Case No. IT-04-81-A, ¶ 37 n.99 (“These other elements of aiding and 
abetting liability are substantial contribution, knowledge that aid provided assists in the 
commission of relevant crimes, and awareness of the essential elements of these crimes.”). 
 152. Id. ¶ 73. 
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Chamber emphasized the necessity of expressly considering specific 
direction in cases where the “aider and abettor is remote from rele-
vant crimes” and, therefore, “evidence proving other elements of aid-
ing and abetting may not be sufficient to prove specific direction.”153 
This approach has elicited widespread—albeit not universal—
criticism.154  Not least among the objections is the apparent novelty 
of the ICTY’s approach.  A much-cited study concludes that there is 
virtually no support in other international case law, comparative 
criminal law, or academic literature for the proposition that “specific 
direction” is or should be an element of aiding and abetting.155 
To some extent, however, the debate may have more to do 
with semantics than substance.  The idea of specific direction may be 
something already implicit in the idea of aiding and abetting; for ex-
ample, there is a difference between actually assisting criminal be-
havior, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, engaging in more 
general activities that somewhere along the line will have the effect 
of remotely assisting an offender’s culpable conduct.  This direction-
ality concept could explain why no culpability attaches to the parents 
whose only assistance to their child’s crime lies in their having 
brought the child into existence and their having fulfilled their gen-
eral parental obligations to provide food, education, a loving home, 
and so on.156  There is an obvious, literal sense in which the parental 
act of procreation makes a critical and necessary contribution to any 
crimes committed by the child, but society does not define that con-
duct as a contribution to crime.  By contrast, when Nancy passes a 
live grenade to Sid knowing what Sid intends to do with it, the assis-
tance is both specific and direct, regardless of whether Nancy is root-
ing for Sid’s success.157 
The evidence from the ICTY’s seminal Tadić Appeals judg-
ment—which introduced the language of specific direction into the 
 
 153. Id. ¶ 39.  On this basis, the Tribunal distinguished “previous appeal judgements 
[that] have not conducted extensive analyses of specific direction.”  Id. ¶ 38.  It explained 
that in those cases: 
The lack of such discussion may be explained by the fact that prior convictions 
for aiding and abetting entered or affirmed by the Appeals Chamber involved 
relevant acts geographically or otherwise proximate to, and thus not remote 
from, the crimes of principal perpetrators.  Where such proximity is present, 
specific direction may be demonstrated implicitly through discussion of other 
elements of aiding and abetting liability, such as substantial contribution. 
Id. 
 154. See supra notes 21, 33 and accompanying text. 
 155. See Stewart, Unprecedented, supra note 21. 
 156. See supra note 114 and accompanying text. 
 157. See supra notes 124–27 and accompanying text. 
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international criminal jurisprudence—suggests a distinction along 
these lines.158  The language makes its appearance in a passage dis-
tinguishing the culpability involved in aiding and abetting from that 
resulting from participation in a JCE, where liability can be estab-
lished based on general contributions to the shared criminal enter-
prise rather than by proof of contributions to particular crimes com-
mitted by the enterprise.  To convict a JCE member, the Tribunal 
explains, “it is sufficient for the participant to perform acts that in 
some way are directed to the furthering of the common plan or pur-
pose,” whereas “[t]he aider and abettor carries out acts specifically 
directed to assist, encourage or lend moral support to the perpetration 
of a certain specific crime.”159  Whatever the precise meaning of the 
words “specifically directed,” few would dispute that criminal prohi-
bitions against aiding and abetting are generally concerned with be-
havior that has both a more specific and a more direct relationship to 
crime than the JCE approach contemplates. 
There are also cognate areas of law that make a similar dis-
tinction, for instance the international humanitarian law rules for de-
termining permissible targets.  It is permissible to attack only “those 
objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effec-
tive contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruc-
tion, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, 
offers a definite military advantage.”160  This standard clearly permits 
the bombing of an armaments factory on account of the direct contri-
bution that armaments make to military action.161  On the other hand, 
attacks on the general agricultural system relied upon by the general 
population are prohibited.162  Likewise, civilians themselves may not 
be targeted “unless and for such time as they take a direct part in hos-
tilities.”163  Taking such a direct part need not involve firing a weap-
 
 158. Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgment, ¶ 229 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the 
Former Yugoslavia July 15, 1999). 
 159. Id. ¶ 229(iii) (emphasis added). 
 160. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to 
the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) art. 52 ¶ 2, June 8, 
1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Additional Protocol I]. 
 161. See ICTY, FINAL REPORT TO THE PROSECUTOR BY THE COMMITTEE ESTABLISHED TO 
REVIEW THE NATO BOMBING CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA  
¶ 37 (June 13, 2000), http://www.icty.org/x/file/Press/nato061300.pdf (“Everyone will agree 
that a munitions factory is a military objective and an unoccupied church is a civilian 
object.”). 
 162. See GARY D. SOLIS, THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT:  INTERNATIONAL 
HUMANITARIAN LAW IN WAR 522 (2010). 
 163. Additional Protocol I, supra note 160, at art. 51 ¶ 3. 
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on.  Were Sid a soldier engaged in combat on the battlefield, it would 
be permissible to target Nancy, a civilian, as she handed him a gre-
nade, or as she fueled his tank.  The civilian café owner who brewed 
Sid’s morning coffee is off-limits however, no matter how much 
Sid’s fearsome combat skills depend on regular caffeination.164 
The most important question, then, is not whether some con-
cept of specific direction appropriately resides in the definition of 
aiding and abetting.  Rather, the question is what role that concept 
plays.  In this Part, I consider several possibilities.  This analysis 
yields a similar conclusion to my examination of purpose.  While the 
strictest interpretations of specific direction produce morally arbitrary 
results, the more plausible interpretations provide less clear guidance. 
A. Specific Direction as Purpose 
One option is that the specific direction standard is simply 
another way of describing the purposive approach to complicity.  As 
a linguistic matter, the Tadić Appeals Chamber’s reference to assis-
tance “directed” toward atrocities connotes intentionality, and this 
understanding comports with Judge Arlette Ramaroson’s concurring 
opinion in Perišić, which argues that specific direction is best under-
stood as an aspect of mens rea.165  This would be an odd result given 
the ICTY’s consistent finding, including in Perišić itself, that 
knowledge rather than purpose is the requisite mens rea.166  However, 
this apparent contradiction may find resolution in the conduct/result 
distinction:  an accomplice who specifically directs assistance to the 
perpetrator’s murderous conduct may be held responsible even if the 
accomplice does not act with the conscious object of bringing about 
the death of any human being.167 
Although the Perišić plurality opinion treats specific direction 
as an actus reus requirement, it too emphasizes an important connec-
tion to mens rea by suggesting that specific direction can be estab-
lished circumstantially by proof of a criminal purpose.168  Under this 
 
 164. See NILS MELZER, INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE ON THE NOTION OF DIRECT 
PARTICIPATION IN HOSTILITIES UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 31–36 (May 
2009), http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/icrc-002-0990.pdf (distinguishing between 
civilians and members of organized armed groups). 
 165. Prosecutor v. Perišić, Case No. IT-04-81-A, Judgment, Opinion Séparée du Juge 
Ramaroson sur la Question de la Visée Spécifique Dans La Complicité Par Aide et 
Encouragment (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Sept. 28, 2013). 
 166. See id.  
 167. See supra Part II.B. 
 168. Prosecutor v. Perišić, Case No. IT-04-81-A, Judgment, ¶ 48 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for 
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approach, in other words, the accused’s criminal purpose will usually 
be sufficient, but not always necessary, to prove specific direction. 
In either event, to the extent that a purposive mens rea can es-
tablish specific direction—whether as a necessary or merely suffi-
cient condition—then the interpretive questions relating to purpose 
will apply. 
B. Specific Direction as Exclusive Direction 
Another option is that specific direction involves an accom-
plice providing assistance whose sole effect is to further criminal 
conduct.  This interpretation finds particular support in the Perišić 
Appeals Chamber’s analysis, which emphasized, “[I]n most cases, 
the provision of general assistance which could be used for both law-
ful and unlawful activities will not be sufficient, alone, to prove that 
this aid was specifically directed to crimes of principal perpetra-
tors.”169  The Chamber further reflected, “In such circumstances, in 
order to enter a conviction for aiding and abetting, evidence estab-
lishing a direct link between the aid provided by an accused individ-
ual and the relevant crimes committed by principal perpetrators is 
necessary.”170  With respect to the Bosnian Serb forces whom Perišić 
assisted, the Chamber emphasized that the “VRS undertook, inter 
alia, lawful combat activities and was not a purely criminal organisa-
tion.”171  On this view, the critical issue is the anticipated uses of the 
assistance.  Aid that the accused knows will be used for purely crimi-
nal purposes is specifically directed toward crime.  General aid that  
 
 
the Former Yugoslavia Sept. 28, 2013) (“[T]he Appeals Chamber acknowledges that 
specific direction may involve considerations that are closely related to questions of mens 
rea.  Indeed, as discussed below, evidence regarding an individual’s state of mind may serve 
as circumstantial evidence that assistance he or she facilitated was specifically directed 
towards charged crimes.”) (emphasis omitted).  The Tribunal does not equate purpose with 
specific direction in so many words, but as Heller has noted: 
It is difficult to imagine more powerful circumstantial evidence that the 
defendant specifically directed his assistance toward an organization’s unlawful 
activities than proof that the defendant specifically intended his assistance to 
facilitate that organization’s unlawful activities.  Can anyone honestly imagine 
a tribunal acquitting, say, a military officer who provided soldiers with 
weapons intending them to be used to execute civilians simply because the 
soldiers could have used the weapons to hunt game, as well? 
Heller, supra note 103. 
 169. Perišić, Case No. IT-04-81-A, ¶ 44. 
 170. Id.  
 171. Id. ¶ 69. 
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will only later be divided between criminal and non-criminal purpos-
es is not. 
Among the various possible interpretations of the ICTY’s 
specific direction language, this approach has rightfully elicited the 
most criticism.  As Stewart has observed, this interpretation could 
even justify acquittal in the Zyklon B case.172  After all, “officers of 
the company were actually supplying Zyklon B to the S.S. for two 
uses:  (a) to exterminate insects and germs within labor and concen-
tration camps (a massive sanitary problem); and (b) to gas Jews.”173  
To appreciate the power of this critique, consider how this problem 
disappears if the supplier can tell, based on the shipping label, which 
batches of gas are to be used for homicide and which for insecticide.  
In that case, the supplier’s culpability rests on his knowledge of the 
specific direction of each shipment.  Yet to hold the supplier respon-
sible only on that basis seems arbitrary. 
There are a few possible responses to this critique in defense 
of an exclusive direction requirement.  One is that the critique con-
fuses ends and means.  The Zyklon B conviction is justifiable because 
even the delousing activities were conducted in support of a concen-
tration camp system that lacked any legitimate or legal purpose.  Per-
haps the portion of gas used for delousing is not a contribution that, 
on its own, should be punishable, but neither does it divert the specif-
ic criminal direction of the aid.  Another response argues that assis-
tance to a criminal organization such as the SS must be treated as per 
se specifically directed to crime, irrespective of how the organization 
puts that assistance to use.  A third response—less applicable to 
Zyklon B than to some other problematic scenarios—is that the law 
must draw a line between legitimate and criminal behavior in a way 
less restrictive to prosecution than what the Perišić Appeals Chamber 
suggested.  For reasons I will now explore, these responses fail, both 
individually and cumulatively, to salvage the exclusive direction 
concept. 
1. Ends and Means 
Framing delousing as a means to an unlawful end may justify 
the result in Zyklon B itself, but doing so fails to address the central 
flaw in the exclusive direction approach.  Consider the example of a 
 
 172. See James Stewart, Comment to Kevin Jon Heller, More Misdirection on Specific 
Direction, OPINIO JURIS (Aug. 17, 2013, 3:13 PM), http://opiniojuris.org/2013/08/13/yet-
more-specific-direction-misdirection. 
 173. Id. 
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German industrialist who aids and abets SS crimes by donating large 
sums to the organization.  The industrialist is also an arts patron and 
separately donates to various cultural endeavors.  Assume that SS 
donations render the donor criminally responsible for SS crimes.  
Can he avoid criminal responsibility by directing his combined dona-
tions to a special fund—such as the Himmler fund confronted in the 
Flick case—that is known to support both the SS and, in good faith, 
the arts?174  Even if the majority of the fund is used for arts patron-
age, the donation is difficult to justify:  after all, the industrialist has 
the choice to support the arts directly without providing any help to 
the SS.  Yet pursuant to Perišić, the donation appears permissible on 
the ground that the fund is used for both legitimate (arts patronage) 
and criminal (SS support) endeavors. 
Perhaps this example proves too much.  As I have hypothe-
sized, the bundling of support is entirely avoidable.  Given that sup-
port for the arts is so readily separable from support for the SS, per-
haps the bundling should not count against specific direction.  But the 
matter may not be so straightforward.  It may be, for example, that 
the industrialist has elected to defer entirely to the fund administrator 
regarding the allocation of donations.  The administrator is free, ac-
cording to her own determination of what will benefit the homeland, 
to donate as much or as little to the SS, the arts, or to any other cause.  
Yet it remains odd to conclude that the industrialist only becomes li-
able when he knows that 100% of the funds—as opposed to say 
95%—are to be directed to the SS. 
Or imagine, alternately, that there is no feasible way to sup-
port a non-criminal cause without directing funds to the SS.  Imagine 
that the SS donates 5% of its budget to a program supporting war or-
phans of its deceased members.  Because the SS itself controls the 
relevant information—who the orphans are, where they live, what 
help they need, etc.—there is no feasible way to help these orphans 
without donating funds to the general use of the SS.  If the industrial-
ist knows that 95% of the donation will provide critical support to 
atrocities in circumstances that would otherwise render the donor 
criminally liable, the non-criminal direction of this 5% hardly pro-
vides a convincing reason to exculpate the industrialist.175 
 
 174.  See supra note 56 and accompanying text. 
 175. For an argument along similar lines, see Ventura, supra note 21, at 526 (“[O]ne 
might argue that isolated incidents of lawful behaviour during conflict should not be used to 
mask a group otherwise characterized by criminality.  That is a fair point.  But, if true, the 
question inevitably becomes how many lawful actions must such a group carry out in order 
to properly qualify as a mixed organization (and thus engage specific direction)?  10 per 
cent, 15 per cent, or 25 per cent of their military actions?  Even if you could pin an accurate  
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2. Criminal and Non-Criminal Organizations 
Another response focuses on the Nuremberg IMT’s assess-
ment that the SS was a criminal organization.  Heller has defended 
the Zyklon B result along these lines, arguing that “all of the SS’s ac-
tivities were unlawful, which is precisely why the IMT specifically 
deemed it a criminal organization.”176  There is some support for this 
view in the Perišić Appeals judgment, which “underscores that the 
VRS was participating in lawful combat activities and was not a 
purely criminal organization.”177 
However, so framed, the criminal-organization concept itself 
appears to do no work.  If it is truly the case that an organization is 
engaged solely in unlawful activities, then assistance to that organiza-
tion cannot be justified on the particular ground that such assistance 
is directed to both lawful and unlawful activities.178  But this point 
does nothing to address the aforementioned problem of assistance to 
an organization that principally concerns itself with unlawful activi-
ties while it also independently conducts lawful or even desirable ac-
 
(or even approximate) number, one would have to ‘capture’ every single one of an army’s 
military operations, then assess which of these were lawful and which unlawful so as to 
determine whether such a group is mixed or not.”). 
 176. Heller, supra note 103.  Kai Ambos has advanced a similar approach, noting the 
distinction between “a pure extermination camp (‘pure’ criminal enterprise) and a mixed 
camp (mixed criminal enterprise) where other (labour) activities also existed and the 
detainees had a realistic chance of survival, i.e. their death was only a ‘side effect’ of the 
inhumane conditions of the camp and the forced labour.”  See Kai Ambos, The ICC and 
Common Purpose:  What Contribution is Required under Article 25(3)(d)?, in THE LAW 
AND PRACTICE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 592, 607 (Carsten Stahn ed., 2015).  
He argues that: 
In the former case, criminal responsibility for external or indirect contributions, 
i.e. taking place from outside the camp, which do not directly relate to the 
destructive purpose of the camp (such as the delivery of potassium cyanide 
does), depends on the knowledge of the supplier:  if he is aware of the criminal 
purpose of the concentration camp and therefore of the criminal impact of his 
contribution, he incurs criminal responsibility.  In the case of contributions to a 
‘mixed’ enterprise, criminal responsibility is predicated on the proof of an 
identifiable individual contribution to concrete crimes. 
Id. 
 177. Prosecutor v. Perišić, Case No. IT-04-81-A, Judgment, ¶ 57 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for 
the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 28, 2013). 
 178. As Ventura notes, wholly criminal organizations are unlikely to exist in the real 
world.  See Ventura, supra note 21, at 526 (“[I]n a real-life armed conflict the existence of a 
wholly ‘criminal organization’ is extremely unlikely.  The central point is this:  as soon as a 
group carries out at least some actions—however small in number—that are consistent with 
IHL, even in a vast and endless sea of criminality, then such a group should fall into the 
category of the VRS in Perišić; that is, a mixed organization . . . .”). 
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tivities.  Does the SS cease to become a criminal organization if it 
donates to war orphans? 
Notably, the Nuremberg IMT did not rule that all of the SS’s 
activities were unlawful.  Instead, the Tribunal determined that the 
SS, along with the other entities it deemed to be criminal, was used 
for “criminal purposes.”179  In particular, it found, “The SS was uti-
lized for purposes which were criminal under the Charter involving 
the persecution and extermination of the Jews, brutalities and killings 
in concentration camps, excesses in the administration of occupied 
territories, the administration of the slave labor program and the mis-
treatment and murder of prisoners of war.”180  The language focuses 
on the unlawful purposes the SS did serve, but does not address the 
potentially countervailing impact of any lawful activities the SS 
might have simultaneously conducted.  It does not address the fact, 
for example, that the Waffen SS, which the judgment treats as part of 
the SS criminal organization, also engaged in the kinds of ordinary 
combat activities that the Perišić Appeals Chamber deemed to be le-
gitimate.181  In the Flick case, moreover, the presiding IMT convicted 
two defendants on the basis of contributing large sums to a fund that 
they knew would partly support the SS.182 
A more defensible approach would maintain that direct assis-
tance to a criminal enterprise that significantly facilitates crimes 
should satisfy the specific direction requirement regardless of wheth-
er the recipient enterprise engages in solely criminal activities.  In 
other words, assistance specifically directed to a criminal enterprise 
could substitute for assistance specifically directed to particular 
crimes.  This approach finds some support in contemporary interna-
tional law.  Although neither the ICC nor any of the contemporary 
tribunals criminalize membership in criminal organizations, they 
have continued to apply special rules of culpability where criminal 
enterprises are involved.183  The Rome Statute, in particular, appears 
to establish a broader aiding and abetting standard where assistance 
to criminal enterprises is concerned.  Whereas Article 25(3)(b)’s gen-
eral aiding and abetting provision includes purposive language, Arti-
cle 25(3)(d) indicates a looser standard where assistance to criminal 
enterprises is concerned.184  The latter provision provides for the pun-
 
 179. United States v. Göring et al., supra note 47, at 276. 
 180. Id. at 273. 
 181. See id.  On the SS’s combat activities, see generally GEORGE H. STEIN, THE 
WAFFEN SS:  HITLER’S ELITE GUARD AT WAR, 1939–45 (1966).  
 182. See supra note 56 and accompanying text. 
 183. See supra notes 145–46 and accompanying text. 
 184. Compare Rome Statute, supra note 28, at art. 25(3)(b) (“Orders, solicits or induces 
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ishment of a person who “contributes to the commission or attempted 
commission of [a crime within the Court’s jurisdiction] by a group of 
persons acting with a common purpose”185 and who intentionally 
makes this contribution “in the knowledge of the intention of the 
group to commit the crime.”186 
Adopting this approach, of course, would require a significant 
alteration of the rule announced in Perišić.  Indeed, it would appear 
to require a different disposition of that case itself, considering the 
Trial Chamber’s finding that “the VRS’s war strategy encompassed 
the commission of crimes.”187  Moreover, this understanding of spe-
cific direction places too much emphasis on the question of whether 
aid goes directly to a criminal enterprise.  Suppose, for example, that 
only certain elements of the VRS formed a criminal enterprise, and 
that Perišić is aware that most, but not all, of the provided aid will 
fall under the control of these elements.  Should it matter whether or 
not those elements are the direct recipients of aid, or whether or not 
Perišić happens to know whether the direct recipient is in fact a 
member of the criminal enterprise?  In the end, what seems to matter 
is the foreseen use of the assistance, not the identity of the direct re-
cipient per se. 
3. Lawful and Unlawful Ends 
A third question surrounding the exclusive direction interpre-
tation concerns how one defines the boundaries between lawful and 
unlawful acts.  One might argue, for example, that even assistance to 
the SS’s combat functions was specifically directed toward crime be-
cause the SS was fighting an illegal war of aggression on behalf of 
Germany.188  Similarly, one could argue that Taylor’s support for the 
 
the commission of such a crime which in fact occurs or is attempted”), with id. at art. 
25(3)(d) (“In any other way contributes to the commission or attempted commission of such 
a crime by a group of persons acting with a common purpose.  Such contribution shall be 
intentional and shall either:  (i) Be made with the aim of furthering the criminal activity or 
criminal purpose of the group, where such activity or purpose involves the commission of a 
crime within the jurisdiction of the Court; or (ii) Be made in the knowledge of the intention 
of the group to commit the crime.”).   
 185. Id. at art. 25(3)(d)(i). 
 186. Id. at art. 25(3)(d)(ii). 
 187. Prosecutor v. Perišić, Case No. IT-04-81-A, Judgment, ¶ 503 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for 
the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 28, 2013). 
 188. See generally 1 TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL 
MILITARY TRIBUNAL 186–226 (1947) (detailing Germany’s war of aggression and setting 
forth the law criminalizing aggression). 
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RUF in Sierra Leone and Serbia’s support for the VRS involved, if 
not the crime of aggression itself, at least a violation of the customary 
principle demanding non-intervention in the internal affairs of a sov-
ereign state, thereby rendering all of the assistance unlawful.189  Alt-
hough this aspect of the assistance may not independently give rise to 
criminal responsibility, perhaps it should count as unlawful for pur-
poses of the specific direction test, ensuring that the portion of the aid 
that does assist crimes remains specifically directed. 
The problem with this response is that it breaches the jus ad 
bellum/in bello divide according to which criminal responsibility for 
the conduct of war is held separate from the legality of participants’ 
respective war aims.190  On this interpretation of specific direction, 
criminal responsibility for aiding and abetting war crimes and crimes 
against humanity would in many cases hinge on the validity of the 
war aims, effectively transforming these cases into prosecutions for 
the unlawful use of force.191 
This is not to say that criminal culpability for aiding and abet-
ting could never involve a rejection of war aims.  One could imagine 
a scenario in which a party’s sole war aim is the perpetration of a 
crime.  For instance, a government seeking to perpetrate genocide 
might deploy armed forces into combat for the sole aim of defeating 
armed resistance to the genocide.  By focusing on the ends, as I sug-
gest above, rather than the means, one could treat all assistance to the 
 
 189. See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 
Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14, ¶¶ 202–09, 229–45 (June 27) (outlining the customary law 
principle of non-intervention and finding “that the support given by the United States . . . to 
the military and paramilitary activities of the contras in Nicaragua, by financial support, 
training, supply of weapons, intelligence and logistic support, constitutes a clear breach of 
the principle of non-intervention”). 
 190. GEORGE P. FLETCHER & JENS DAVID OHLIN, DEFENDING HUMANITY:  WHEN FORCE 
IS JUSTIFIED AND WHY 21–22 (2008) (“The reason for adopting a rigorous distinction 
between jus ad bellum and jus in bello is the need for a bright-line cleavage . . . .  
Soldiers . . . know that, regardless of who started the conflict, certain means of warfare are 
clearly illegal.”). 
 191. Pursuing this path would also raise questions of institutional competence, 
considering in particular that no international tribunal since World War II has had 
jurisdiction over the crime of aggression.  See ICTY Statute, supra note 19 (no jurisdiction 
over aggression); ICTR Statute, supra note 19 (same); SCSL Statute, supra note 19 (same); 
ECCC Statute, supra note 19 (same); STL Statute, supra note 19 (same).  In 2010, the States 
Parties of the ICC adopted a proposed amendment to the Rome Statute which would give the 
Court jurisdiction over the crime of aggression pending ratification by at least thirty States 
Parties and a further vote by the Assembly of States Parties no earlier than 2017.  See 
generally Sean D. Murphy, The Crime of Aggression at the International Criminal Court, in 
THE OXFORD HANDBOOK ON THE USE OF FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 533 (Marc Weller 
ed., 2015).  
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government forces as specifically directed toward genocide.  But 
such cases will be hard to come by.  In actual historical cases, it is 
usually possible to identify a war aim—such as the expansion of 
German territory—that is analytically distinct from the perpetration 
of atrocities, however closely the two may be linked.192 
There may also be cases in which an armed group that pur-
ports to pursue legitimate war aims in fact operates as nothing more 
than a roving band of criminals.  Heller has invoked Taylor’s assis-
tance to the RUF and AFRC as an example of this structure, noting 
that “much of that assistance took place during phases of the conflict 
in Sierra Leone in which the RUF and AFRC were nothing more than 
criminal organizations.”193 
C. “Specific Enough” Direction 
A final possibility is to abandon the insistence on exclusive 
direction.  Instead, according to a less rigid interpretation, the con-
cept of “specific enough” involves a sliding scale rather than a 
bright-line distinction.  What matters on this account is the substanti-
ality of the assistance that goes to criminal ends, including the por-
tion of assistance going respectively to lawful and unlawful purposes.  
When a donor provides large sums to a group while knowing that a 
substantial portion of this funding will be diverted to crime, then the 
donor is on notice that the support is specifically directed to unlawful 
purposes.  Instead of exclusive direction, this interpretation demands 
a significant, “specific enough” direction. 
This way of conceiving specific direction is both textually 
plausible and, it would appear, sufficiently adaptable to answer 
Perišić’s critics.  But it becomes so at the cost of indeterminacy, 
leaving unresolved the difficult question of how to assess when assis-
tance has become substantial and specific enough to constitute crimi-
nal aiding and abetting.  A more fatal problem, however, is the fact 
that this understanding appears redundant.  Even prior to Perišić, in-
ternational tribunal case law had established that aiders and abettors 
must make a substantial contribution to crime.194  And as I argue in 
the next Part, the best understanding of this substantiality require-
ment already includes considerations concerning the specificity and 
directionality of assistance. 
 
 192. See generally 1 TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL 
MILITARY TRIBUNAL 192–213 (1947) (detailing Germany’s territorial conquests).   
 193. Heller, supra note 103. 
 194. See supra note 41 and accompanying text. 
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IV. SUBSTANTIAL CONTRIBUTION 
For tribunals that have rejected both purpose and specific di-
rection as elements of aiding and abetting, the primary protection 
against over-criminalization is the requirement of a substantial or 
significant contribution.  Although this approach is most associated 
with the ad hoc tribunals, a similar framework has animated some 
early decisions concerning Article 25(3)(d) of the Rome Statute, 
which prohibits knowing contributions to crimes committed by a 
“group of persons acting with a common purpose.”195  The cases in-
 
 195. The text of Article 25(3)(d) extends to one who “[i]n any other way contributes to 
the commission or attempted commission of such a crime by a group of persons acting with 
a common purpose.”  Rome Statute, supra note 28, at art. 25(3)(d) (emphasis added).  A 
literal reading of this language raises the disturbing possibility that it includes contributions 
of any kind, including the sorts of remote, trivial, or neutral contributions that have not 
traditionally given rise to criminal responsibility.  See Jens David Ohlin, Three Conceptual 
Problems with the Doctrine of Joint Criminal Enterprise, 5 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 69, 79 
(2007) (observing that the effect of this provision is to criminalize the sale of basic, readily 
available services such as when “[m]erchants sell food, water and clothing to criminals; they 
sell cars and gasoline and repair their vehicles; they rent them office space, apartments and 
houses”).  The meaning of this language remains unsettled pending an authoritative 
interpretation by the ICC Appeals Chamber.  Lower chamber decisions in two cases have 
ruled that Article 25(3)(d) applies only to “significant” contributions.  See Prosecutor v. 
Katanga, ICC-01/04-01/07-3436, Judgment Pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, ¶ 1632 
(Mar. 7, 2014) (“[A] significant contribution, analysed in relation to each crime, must be 
proven beyond reasonable doubt.”); Prosecutor v. Mbarushimana, ICC-01/04-01/10-465, 
Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, ¶ 283 (Dec. 16, 2001) (“[T]he Chamber finds that 
the contribution to the commission of a crime under article 25(3)(d) of the Statute cannot be 
just any contribution and there is a threshold of significance below which responsibility 
under this provision does not arise.”).  In another case, the Pre-Trial Chamber found that 
Article 25(3)(d) is “satisfied by a less than ‘substantial’ contribution,” but did not elaborate 
further on the possible limits of this finding.  Prosecutor v. Ruto, ICC-01/09-01/11-373, 
Decision on the Confirmation of Charges Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome 
Statute, ¶ 354 (Jan. 23, 2012).   
Finally, one Appeals Chamber judge, issuing a separate opinion to a judgment that 
did not address this particular issue, likewise reasoned that Article 25(3)(d) did not impose 
“a minimum level or threshold of contribution,” but nevertheless acknowledged the 
problems associated with “so-called ‘neutral’ aid,” such as the provision of “food or utilities 
to an armed group.”  Prosecutor v. Mbarushimana, ICC-01/04-01/10-514, Judgment on the 
Appeal of the Prosecutor Against the Decision of the Pre-Trial Chamber I of 16 December 
2011 Entitled “Decision on the Confirmation of Charges,” Separate Opinion of Judge Silvia 
Fernández de Gurmendi, ¶ 12 (May 30, 2012).  Without elaborating on specific criteria, 
Judge Fernández de Gurmendi maintained, “This problem is better addressed by analysing 
the normative and causal links between the contribution and the crime rather than requiring a 
minimum level of contribution.”  Id.  As such, Judge Fernández de Gurmendi’s position 
appears to reject a strictly quantitative threshold for contribution while nevertheless 
endorsing some qualitative metric.  On these cases, see Ambos, supra note 176.  On the 
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dicate significant uncertainty, however, on how courts should define 
and apply the material elements. 
With respect to mens rea, the ICTY case law has maintained 
that the aider and abettor must provide knowing assistance to a crime, 
but has vacillated on the kind of knowledge required.  In Tadić, the 
Appeals Chamber held, “In the case of aiding and abetting, the requi-
site mental element is knowledge that the acts performed by the aider 
and abettor assist the commission of a specific crime by the princi-
pal.”196  Read strictly, this language might preclude conviction even 
in a case like Zyklon B where the accused has general knowledge that 
his assistance will provide the means for the commission of mass 
atrocities, but does not have particular knowledge of particular 
crimes at the level of the individual perpetrators and victims.  Other 
judgments have clarified that the aider or abettor need only “be aware 
of the type and the essential elements of the crime(s) to be commit-
ted,” but need not “already foresee[] the place, time and number of 
the precise crimes which may be committed in consequence of his 
supportive contributions . . . .”197  So described, the type of 
knowledge embraced by the ICTY comports with the ICC’s defini-
tion of knowledge in terms of “awareness that a circumstance exists 
or a consequence will occur in the ordinary course of events.”198 
Yet other judgments have described complicity’s mental ele-
ment in looser terms.  In Blaskić, for instance, the ICTY Appeals 
Chamber ruled that criminal knowledge merely entailed awareness 
“that one of a number of crimes will probably be committed,”199 
leading critics to conclude that the ICTY had embraced a form of 
recklessness as sufficient for aiding and abetting.200  In addition, the 
Appeals Chamber of the SCSL has explicitly found that dolus even-
tualis—the civil analogue to recklessness—is sufficient to punish 
aiding and abetting.201  The justifiability of this broader approach to 
 
difficulties posed by Article 25(3)(d), see generally Randle C. DeFalco, Contextualizing 
Actus Reus under Article 25(3)(d) of the ICC Statute, 11 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 715 (2013). 
 196. Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgment, ¶ 229 (Int’l Crim. Trib for the 
Former Yugoslavia July 15, 1999). 
 197. Prosecutor v. Orić, Case No. IT-03-68-T, Judgment, ¶ 288 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the 
Former Yugoslavia June 30, 2006) (collecting cases). 
 198. Rome Statute, supra note 28, at art. 30(3). 
 199. Prosecutor v. Blaskić, Case No. IT-95-14-A, Judgment, ¶ 50 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for 
the Former Yugoslavia July 29, 2004). 
 200. See, e.g., FLAVIO NOTO, SECONDARY LIABILITY IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 
135 (2013) (arguing that the ICTY and ICTR “have implicitly acknowledged dolus 
eventualis or recklessness as a sufficient mens rea for aiding and abetting”). 
 201. See supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
 590 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW [54:531 
complicity lies beyond the scope of this Article.  As the debate over 
Perišić reveals, however, knowledge-based aiding and abetting can 
prove controversial even when the accused acted in full awareness 
that his assistance would enable crimes. 
The concept of substantial assistance, meanwhile, remains ra-
ther vague.  Indeed, it may be easier to begin by considering what is 
not substantial assistance.  The case law has consistently distin-
guished the concept from that of causation.  In Furundžija, for in-
stance, the Trial Chamber rejected the proposition that “the acts of 
the accomplice need bear a causal relationship to, or be a conditio si-
ne qua non for, those of the principal.”202  Hence, the accomplice 
who stands as a lookout for a bank robber or provides other forms of 
critical assistance can be held criminally responsible even if the 
crime would have succeeded absent her assistance.  This view ac-
cords with the prominent view of aiding and abetting outlined by 
Sanford Kadish, according to which a causation requirement attaches 
to principals but not accomplices.203 
If, however, a causal relationship to a completed crime is not 
necessary for accomplice liability, it is also well recognized that a 
causal relationship is not sufficient to establish culpability either, as 
there will be many cases in which actors knowingly undertake acts 
which are necessary to the perpetration of crimes by principals yet do 
not plausibly give rise to criminal culpability.204  Imagine that a head 
of state acts to commit her nation’s military in support of an embat-
tled allied state that is the victim of foreign aggression.  International 
law permits the armed intervention as an exercise of collective self-
defense,205 and the head of state is committed to conducting hostili-
ties in accordance with the rules of international humanitarian law.  
 
 202. Prosecutor v. Furundžija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, Judgment, ¶ 233 (Int’l Crim. 
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 10, 1998). 
 203. This point is uncontroversial.  See, e.g., Sanford H. Kadish, Complicity, Cause and 
Blame:  A Study in the Interpretation of Doctrine, 73. CAL. L. REV. 323, 357 (1985) (“In 
causation, the requirement of a condition sine qua non assures this sense of success, since 
the requirement means that without the act the result would not have happened as it did.  In 
complicity, however, a sine qua non relationship in this sense need not be established.  It is 
not required that the prosecution prove, as it must in causation cases, that the result would 
not have occurred without the actions of the secondary party.”); State v. Tally, 102 Ala. 25, 
69 (1894) (“The assistance given . . . need not contribute to the criminal result in the sense 
that but for it the result would not have ensued.  It is quite sufficient if it facilitated a result 
that would have transpired without it.  It is quite enough if the aid merely rendered it easier 
for the principal actor to accomplish the end intended by him and the aider and abettor, 
though in all human probability the end would have been attained without it.”). 
 204. See supra note 114 and accompanying text. 
 205. U.N. Charter art. 51. 
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Nevertheless, the head of state is aware, as a matter of historical ex-
perience, that military engagements of this scale will inevitably in-
volve the perpetration of isolated war crimes by individual soldiers, 
and there is virtual certainty that, despite every effort to prevent and 
punish, some of her own troops will commit crimes.  Again, there is a 
necessary relationship between the decision to go to war and these 
subsequent crimes, but this is not the kind of relationship that is 
enough, without more, to render the head of state responsible for the 
resulting war crimes. 
There is, however, another way of understanding causation 
that better fits the idea of substantiality.  Michael Moore has argued 
that “a cause of a certain harm need not be a necessary condition of 
that harm’s existence,”206 and that the line between substantial and de 
minimis contributions “is not governed by counterfactual depend-
ence.”207  He notes that “X can be a substantial cause of Y without X 
being necessary for Y—witness the fire that joins another fire of 
equal size, and the two together jointly burn down the victim’s 
house.”208  At the same time, and consistent with my example above, 
“X can be a de minimis causal contributor even though X was neces-
sary for Y—as where I remind you of how much you hate V, and 
(with that reminder) you go off and kill V, when otherwise you 
wouldn’t have.”209 
Distinctions of this sort appear in various national criminal 
law doctrines that differentiate between different types of causal con-
tributions.  The concept of proximate or legal cause, for example, has 
assumed various guises.  The Model Penal Code formulation pre-
cludes punishment for injury or harm that is “too remote or acci-
dental in its occurrence to have a [just] bearing on the actor’s liability 
or on the gravity of the offense.”210  There is also Moore’s favored 
“substantial factor” test, embraced by the American Law Institute’s 
Restatement (Second) of Torts.211  In German law, moreover, there is 
the concept of “objective attribution,” which demands that “the of-
fender’s conduct must have created a wrongful risk of [the] specific 
 
 206. Michael S. Moore, Causing, Aiding and the Superfluity of Accomplice Liability, 
156 U. PA. L. REV. 395, 406 (2007). 
 207. Id. at 421. 
 208. Id. 
 209. Id.  
 210. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.03 (AM. LAW INST. 1962). 
 211. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 431 (AM. LAW INST. 1965); Moore, supra note 
206, at 421 (“[W]e need only what the first and second iterations of the Restatement of Torts 
needed:  to treat causation as a primitive—a ‘factor’—save for one characteristic, namely 
that there can be more or less of it.”). 
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result, and the result must be the product of this very risk.”212  Alt-
hough these approaches differ from each other in ways that could in 
principle require different outcomes in particular cases,213 they are all 
notoriously difficult to apply, leaving adjudicators with substantial 
discretion to exclude “causal contributions that are too remote, 
strange or unfair.”214  As the Supreme Court of New Jersey has ob-
served in the context of the Model Penal Code standard, its open-
ended causation standard inevitably relies on the application of 
community norms: 
[O]ur trust in juries to understand and apply the “not 
too remote” element “is indicative of a belief that the 
jury in a criminal prosecution serves as the conscience 
of a community and the embodiment of the common 
sense and feelings reflective of society as a 
whole.” . . .  “[A]nd law in the last analysis must re-
flect the general community sense of justice.”215 
At the international level as well, the requirement of a sub-
stantial contribution fails to provide a bright-line distinction between 
guilt and innocence, and the case law has provided relatively little 
guidance on the application of this standard.  Many judgments fail to 
elucidate it at all,216 whereas others have emphasized generally that 
the accomplice’s contribution must increase the likelihood or ease of 
the crime.217  Thus, as one author has noted, this approach leaves it to 
individual adjudicators to “decide on a case-by-case basis whether in 
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the particular circumstances the assistance should or should not 
properly be regarded as criminal.”218 
One consequence of this discretion is that it allows courts to 
accommodate the concerns about overbreadth that have led some to 
embrace the purposive approach or the specific direction standard.  
The examples considered in this Article indicate a range of qualita-
tive and quantitative factors that impact assessments of blameworthi-
ness and that could be said to bear upon the substantiality of contri-
butions to crime.219  I consider several of these factors below. 
A. Mens Rea 
One such factor is the mental state of the accused.  Although 
mens rea is, of course, a distinct legal element, the actor’s state of 
mind can also affect the substantiality of a contribution.  Even if aid-
ing and abetting does not require a strict purpose in the sense of a 
conscious object to bring about criminal harms, the existence of such 
a purpose simplifies the blameworthiness determination.  Where an 
accomplice has consciously associated herself with a crime and has 
taken action to effect a criminal purpose, there is less need for legal 
protections at the level of the actus reus.  Nevertheless, even purpose-
ful contributions become problematic when they are too remote from 
or insignificant to the completed crime, raising concerns that pun-
ishment would amount to the criminalization of mere wishes.220 
B. Significance, Specificity, and Direction 
In addition, there are a number of factors having to do with 
the specificity and proximity of the assistance.  There is, for instance, 
the quantitative question of how much an actor’s assistance or en-
couragement has assisted the perpetration of a crime.  The large sums 
at issue in the Flick case made a significant contribution to SS atroci-
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ties in a way that pocket change would not have.221  The accomplice 
who instructs a burglar on how to deactivate a particular home alarm 
system makes a greater contribution than one who merely provides 
driving directions that the burglar would otherwise have easily ac-
cessed on his phone.  Likewise, Nancy’s handing of a live grenade to 
Sid at the moment he required it for murderous purposes makes a 
critical contribution to Sid’s crime in a way that a store clerk’s sale of 
a generic, generally available item, such as a screwdriver, typically 
will not. 
There is also the question of how much the accomplice’s acts 
take the form of assistance tailored to the crime itself rather than gen-
eralized support.  I have already mentioned the relevance of this dis-
tinction to mens rea questions222 and to the interpretation of the 
Perišić specific direction requirement,223 yet this distinction also 
bears upon the question of substantiality.  All else being equal, assis-
tance that serves no function except to aid a crime presents a more 
substantial contribution than does general assistance, such as the pa-
rental provision of food, clothing, and monetary support, that aids an 
offender only in the sense of securing basic necessities of life that en-
able all of the recipient’s productive activities, both nefarious and 
benign. 
As the debate over specific direction reveals, moreover, the 
distinction between generalized and particular assistance can depend 
on the context, including the anticipated use of the assistance.  Gen-
eral monetary aid to an armed group becomes easier to characterize 
as substantial assistance to crime when the donor realizes that the re-
cipient is a criminal enterprise or that most or all of the funds will be 
directed by the recipient toward criminal ends. 
Finally, where the provider of assistance is a collective entity, 
the assessment of individual blameworthiness must also look to the 
significance of the individual accused’s role within the organizational 
effort.  In the Zyklon B case, for instance, the Tribunal convicted the 
owner of the company and his second-in-command, but acquitted a 
third accused who had worked as a gassing technician.224  With re-
spect to this defendant, the Judge Advocate had instructed the Tribu-
nal to consider “whether there was any evidence that he was in a po-
sition either to influence the transfer of gas to Auschwitz or to 
prevent it,” and further observed, “If he were not in such a position, 
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no knowledge of the use to which the gas was put could make him 
guilty.”225  The Perišić and Taylor cases likewise focused on senior 
officials who played instrumental roles in the policies at issue.226 
C. Reasonable Precautions 
An additional consideration concerns the precautions, if any, 
taken by an actor to prevent the criminal misuse of assistance that 
may appear more general in nature.  This consideration is especially 
important in cases like Taylor and Perišić that involve crimes perpe-
trated by armed groups whose operations were critically dependent 
on outside support facilitated by the accused.  The defense that this 
support was merely aimed at legitimate combat activities becomes 
less convincing in the absence of evidence that the accused took any 
effort whatsoever to prevent the misuse of that assistance, such as by 
conditioning future assistance on the effective implementation of 
measures to suppress and punish crime, or perhaps by considering al-
ternate ways to advance the legitimate non-criminal purposes.227  Es-
pecially where the recipients depend on the aid to carry out systemat-
ic atrocities, it becomes easier in this scenario to view the aid 
provider as engaged in substantial assistance even if much of the aid 
does support non-criminal purposes. 
One might object here by invoking Duff’s concern about 
omissions.228  If substantial assistance can sometimes be established 
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by an actor’s failure to take reasonable precautions, does this result 
not amount to punishment for mere omissions?  This objection fails 
on at least two counts.  In the first place, putting aside the question of 
inculpation, surely an actor’s showing that she undertook serious ef-
forts to prevent the use of her assistance toward criminal ends should 
count favorably toward exculpation.  To hold otherwise would 
threaten imposing an aiding and abetting standard that is broader than 
the already-broadened standard applicable to military commanders 
who have a special duty to prevent and punish crimes committed by 
their subordinates.  Although military commanders are sometimes 
held criminally responsible for crimes they failed to prevent, this du-
ty is subject to a reasonableness standard.  The Rome Statute, for in-
stance, requires not only that “[t]he military commander or person ei-
ther knew or, owing to the circumstances at the time, should have 
known that the forces were committing or about to commit such 
crimes,” but also “[t]hat military commander or person failed to take 
all necessary and reasonable measures within his or her power to 
prevent or repress their commission or to submit the matter to the 
competent authorities for investigation and prosecution.”229  Notwith-
standing ambiguities and debate regarding the scope of this duty,230 
tribunals have not required commanders to maintain a risk-free envi-
ronment.  Nor has any court held that a general certainty that some 
subordinates will continue to commit crimes, notwithstanding a 
commander’s best efforts to prevent and punish, is sufficient to pre-
clude the commander from waging war. 
Likewise, evidence that an actor has reasonably endeavored 
to prevent the misuse of assistance should serve a similar exculpating 
function in the aiding and abetting context, even if the actor is aware 
that these efforts will not be perfect.  Consider again the case of as-
sistance to rebels in Syria.  There is an important moral difference 
between, on the one hand, a program to aid Syrian rebels that seeks 
to supply only moderate groups not engaged in systematic atrocities 
and to accompany that support with training in the rules of war and, 
on the other hand, a program that, without accompanying precau-
tions, targets aid to groups that are engaged in systematic atrocities.  
This difference persists even if, in the first instance, there is a virtual  
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certainty that some of the aid will inevitably end up facilitating war 
crimes.231 
The second point is one that I have already explored.232  The 
analogy to omissions fares better when the actor’s assistance takes 
the form of an ordinary course of business—such as the clerk’s sale 
of screwdrivers to all paying customers—and the actor undertakes 
that course of business in the manner normally expected of law abid-
ing citizens.  But the analogy breaks down when the assistance lacks 
this routine, anonymous quality and assumes a more intimate quality, 
such as when a government has affiliated itself with the goals of an 
armed group and, toward that end, has reached a particularized deci-
sion to render aid to that group.  In that scenario, it makes more sense 
to view the assistance an action, and when a government delivers aid 
to groups engaged in systematic atrocities, while taking no precau-
tions to prevent the use of its aid to assist those atrocities, the absence 
of precautions speaks more to the manner in which the government 
has chosen to deliver the aid. 
V. BETWEEN LAW AND MORALITY 
This review of the competing approaches to aiding and abet-
ting yields several conclusions.  First, although the international de-
bate regarding accomplice liability has focused largely on the differ-
ences between the approaches adopted by various international 
tribunals, there are equally, if not more, impactful questions sur-
rounding interpretive choices within each approach and their applica-
tion.  Indeed, as I have argued, none of these approaches—taken at 
face value—provides straightforward answers to the dilemmas posed 
by foreign assistance cases such as Perišić and Taylor. 
Second, a broad similarity exists across these approaches re-
garding the kinds of factors that are relevant to culpability.  For in-
stance, questions concerning the proximity and specificity of assis-
tance are clearly relevant to the specific direction approach, yet they 
also arise when navigating the conduct/result distinction under the 
purposive approach,233 when determining whether an actor has pro-
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vided sufficiently substantial assistance,234 and indeed when deter-
mining whether an actor can fairly be said to have provided assis-
tance to a crime in the first instance.235  Similarly, I have argued that 
an actor’s precautions (or lack thereof) taken to prevent the use of as-
sistance for criminal ends are a relevant factor in determining the 
substantiality of the actor’s assistance.236  At the same time, the fail-
ure to take readily available precautions falls among the factors that 
an adjudicator is likely to consider under a purposive approach when 
determining whether or not the actor shared the criminal goals of the 
principal perpetrators.237 
Third, these common factors do not operate as bright-line 
rules that provide clear demarcations between guilt and innocence.  
Instead, they require the adjudicator to consider a range of factors 
that operate along a continuum.  This is true especially with respect 
to the more plausible understandings of aiding and abetting.  While 
both the strictest purposive approach and the strictest interpretation 
of specific direction as exclusive direction at least aspire toward rela-
tive certainty, they do so at the cost of an overly narrow and morally 
arbitrary approach.  The more plausible approaches to aiding and 
abetting, on the other hand, draw a less determinate line between 
guilt and innocence. 
This last point raises a problem for the adjudication of aiding 
and abetting cases.  For instance, the substantial contribution analysis 
that I have outlined may well identify factors that are morally rele-
vant to the determination of guilt.  But there is a difference between 
moral relevance, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, a criminal 
legal standard that provides the kind of notice and predictability nec-
essary to safeguard the liberty of the accused in a manner consistent 
with the principle of legality.238  Highlighting this point, Flavio Noto 
has expressed the concern that the substantial contribution require-
ment invites an arbitrary determination, one reached only “after the 
blameworthiness of [a defendant’s] conduct has been decided on.”239  
While this risk may be most obvious in the context of substantial 
contribution, it also complicates the other competing approaches to 
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aiding and abetting.240  In the foreign assistance context, moreover, 
there is special need for certainty concerning the boundaries between 
legitimate and criminal efforts, as a vague standard could unduly de-
ter valuable foreign aid programs that pursue important foreign poli-
cy goals based on concern that some of the aid will unavoidably fall 
into the wrong hands.241 
Some uncertainty, of course, is endemic to criminal law.  
Consider, for instance, the “reasonable person” standard, which un-
derlies the common law concepts of negligence and recklessness, as 
well as other criminal law doctrines.242  To apply the Model Penal 
Code’s influential definition of recklessness, for instance, the fact 
finder must determine whether the accused has consciously disre-
garded a risk that is both “substantial” and “unjustifiable” and that 
involves a “gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a law-
abiding person would observe in the actor’s situation.”243  The Code 
does not define the words “substantial” and “unjustifiable,” nor does 
it specify what standard of conduct a law-abiding person would fol-
low.  These determinations are left to the judgment of the fact finder.  
Other concepts, such as the civil law dolus eventualis, the common 
law proximate cause, and the German objective attribution, are simi-
larly, if not more, elusive.244  And even elements which are relatively 
determinate in concept may be less so in the application, as will often 
be in the case when a fact finder, unable to read the accused’s mind, 
ends up imputing a criminal purpose based on the circumstantial evi-
dence.245 
The issue, then, is not whether culpability for aiding and abet-
ting will involve some indeterminacy.  It will, and that fact is neither 
surprising nor, by itself, uniquely troubling.  The more relevant issue 
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is whether the law can manage that indeterminacy in a way that ren-
ders the assignment of criminal responsibility sufficiently predictable 
while also maintaining a normatively meaningful distinction between 
guilt and innocence.  The above-referenced Model Penal Code provi-
sions indicate one important way of managing such indeterminacy:  
by specifying that criminal recklessness and negligence each demand 
a “gross deviation” from the reasonable person’s standard of conduct, 
the Code seeks to avoid the imposition of criminal responsibility in 
close cases, reserving punishment only for situations that are well 
past the line of what could be considered reasonable.  Arguing along 
similar lines in the international context, Kai Ambos maintains that 
“criminal conduct should be limited to a significant deviation from 
standard social or commercial behaviour in order to capture really 
wrongful and blameworthy conduct.”246  Culpability for aiding and 
abetting should likewise focus on such cases where there is a clear 
separation between the accused’s behavior and that expected of the 
reasonable, law-abiding citizen. 
Even here the foreign assistance cases may raise difficulties 
not present in more run-of-the-mill cases.  What, for instance, is the 
standard to be applied by a reasonable government official tasked 
with the disbursement of foreign aid in pursuit of vital foreign policy 
interests and perhaps with only limited ability to control how that aid 
will be employed?  The conclusion that this determination must be 
left to the application of community norms provides scant reassur-
ance where stakeholders lack consensus on the appropriate norm. 
Nevertheless, the debate over questions such as this one need 
not preclude courts from agreement on clearer cases where the bal-
ance of factors overwhelmingly supports a finding of criminal guilt.  
And as I have explored, cases such as these need not entail evidence 
that the accused shared the criminal purposes of the principal perpe-
trators and extended significant support with the deliberate aim to 
further their crimes.247  Nor must they be limited to situations where 
the accused provided aid exclusively directed toward criminal activi-
ty.248  There is also a strong argument for criminal culpability in cas-
es like Taylor and Perišić where the accused is found to have know-
ingly provided critical support to a group engaged in widespread or 
systematic atrocities while making no good faith effort to prevent the 
misuse of that support.  Concerns about a slippery slope with respect 
to other, less clear cases should not derail agreement on cases like 
these. 
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By the same token, as I have argued, the law can promote the 
foreseeability of punishment by clearly distinguishing those actors 
who pursue legitimate policy objectives while taking affirmative pre-
cautions to prevent the use of their support for criminal purposes.249  
Where such precautions are pursued in good faith, the law should not 
demand a risk-free environment.  Knowledge that some aid will inev-
itably, despite all reasonable precautions, find itself directed to crim-
inal purposes is not the kind of knowing contribution the law should 
target. 
An exhaustive exploration of such cases lies beyond the scope 
of this Article.  My more modest point argues that the resolution of 
aiding and abetting cases requires a moral judgment that is not reduc-
ible to the recitation of elements debated by international tribunals.  
The result is an indeterminacy that is both inevitable and familiar to 
criminal law. 
CONCLUSION 
The challenge of aiding and abetting liability has presented 
international criminal tribunals with some of the most difficult ques-
tions concerning the scope of criminal responsibility.  The foreign as-
sistance cases pose moral dilemmas that have predictably divided 
courts and commenters. 
In this Article, I have challenged two assumptions underlying 
the debate over these questions.  First, I have contested the judicial 
assumption that the law of aiding and abetting can or should be de-
termined by a precedential analysis that purports to identify custom-
ary standards in historical cases, which themselves do not reveal a 
consistent approach.  The courts would do better to acknowledge that 
customary international law does not define complicity with suffi-
cient particularity and that precedential analysis is no substitute for 
the normative analysis that the courts have generally declined to con-
duct. 
Second, I have argued that the competing approaches to aid-
ing and abetting fail to capture the critical moral distinctions underly-
ing the foreign assistance cases.  Instead, each of these approaches is 
subject to substantial variation of interpretation and application, with 
the most plausible understandings producing the greatest indetermi-
nacy.  This indeterminacy is hardly unique to international law, as the 
resolution of “ordinary” criminal law cases at the domestic level will 
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often depend on the discretionary application of community norms.  
The special difficulty of these cases, however, lies in determining 
what those norms are.  This difficulty demands judicial caution, but it 
need not paralyze the administration of justice in cases where a bal-
ance of factors strongly supports conviction. 
 
